GM Friens

The space had better days. Those greenish spikes...oh wow, haven't felt that in ages. Cryptocurrencies and NFTs have lost popularity. Google agrees. Both are declining.

As seen below, crypto interest spiked in May because of the Luna fall. NFT interest is similar to early October last year.

This makes me think NFTs are mostly hype and FOMO. No art or community. I've seen enough initiatives to know that communities stick around if they're profitable. Once it starts falling, they move on to the next project. The space has no long-term investments. Flip everything.

OpenSea trading volume has stayed steady for months. May's volume is 1.8 million ETH ($3.3 billion).

Despite this, I think NFTs and crypto will stick around. In bad markets, builders gain most.

Only 4k developers are active on Ethereum blockchain. It's low. A great chance for the space enthusiasts.

An employee of OpenSea might get a 40-year prison sentence for insider trading using NFTs.

Nathaniel Chastian, an OpenSea employee, traded on insider knowledge. He'll serve 40 years for that.

Here's what happened if you're unfamiliar.

OpenSea is a secondary NFT marketplace. Their homepage featured remarkable drops. Whatever gets featured there, NFT prices will rise 5x.

Chastian was at OpenSea. He chose forthcoming NFTs for OpenSeas' webpage.

Using anonymous digital currency wallets and OpenSea accounts, he would buy NFTs before promoting them on the homepage, showcase them, and then sell them for at least 25 times the price he paid.

From June through September 2021, this happened. Later caught, fired. He's charged with wire fraud and money laundering, each carrying a 20-year maximum penalty.

Although web3 space is all about decentralization, a step like this is welcomed since it restores faith in the area. We hope to see more similar examples soon.

Here's the press release.

Understanding smart contracts

@cantino.eth has a Twitter thread on smart contracts. Must-read. Also, he appears educated about the space, so follow him.

I'm trying to understand why Bitcoin NFTs aren't ready.

Ordinals, a new Bitcoin protocol, has been controversial. NFTs can be added to Bitcoin transactions using the protocol. They are not tokens or fungible. Bitcoin NFTs are transaction metadata. Yes. They're not owned.

In January, the Ordinals protocol allowed data like photos to be directly encoded onto sats, the smallest units of Bitcoin worth 0.00000001 BTC, on the Bitcoin blockchain. Ordinals does not need a sidechain or token like other techniques. The Ordinals protocol has encoded JPEG photos, digital art, new profile picture (PFP) projects, and even 1993 DOOM onto the Bitcoin network.

Ordinals inscriptions are permanent digital artifacts preserved on the Bitcoin blockchain. It differs from Ethereum, Solana, and Stacks NFT technologies that allow smart contract creators to change information. Ordinals store the whole image or content on the blockchain, not just a link to an external server, unlike centralized databases, which can change the linked image, description, category, or contract identifier.

So far, more than 50,000 ordinals have been produced on the Bitcoin blockchain, and some of them have already been sold for astronomical amounts. The Ethereum-based CryptoPunks NFT collection spawned Ordinal Punk. Inscription 620 sold for 9.5 BTC, or $218,000, the most.

Segwit and Taproot, two important Bitcoin blockchain updates, enabled this. These protocols store transaction metadata, unlike Ethereum, where the NFT is the token. Bitcoin's NFT is a sat's transaction details.

What effects do ordinary values and NFTs have on the Bitcoin blockchain?

Ordinals will likely have long-term effects on the Bitcoin Ecosystem since they store, transact, and compute more data.

Charges Ordinals introduce scalability challenges. The Bitcoin network has limited transaction throughput and increased fees during peak demand. NFTs could make network transactions harder and more expensive. Ordinals currently occupy over 50% of block space, according to Glassnode.

One of the protocols that supported Ordinals Taproot has also seen a huge uptick:

Taproot use increases block size and transaction costs.

This could cause network congestion but also support more L2s with Ordinals-specific use cases. Dune info here.

Storage Needs The Bitcoin blockchain would need to store more data to store NFT data directly. Since ordinals were introduced, blocksize has tripled from 0.7mb to over 2.2mb, which could increase storage costs and make it harder for nodes to join the network.

Use Case Diversity On the other hand, NFTs on the Bitcoin blockchain could broaden Bitcoin's use cases beyond storage and payment. This could expand Bitcoin's user base. This is two-sided. Bitcoin was designed to be trustless, decentralized, peer-to-peer money.

Chain to permanently store NFTs as ordinals will change everything.

Popularity rise This new use case will boost Bitcoin appeal, according to some. This argument fails since Bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency. Popularity doesn't require a new use case. Cryptocurrency adoption boosts Bitcoin. It need not compete with Ethereum or provide extra benefits to crypto investors. If there was a need for another chain that supports NFTs (there isn't), why would anyone choose the slowest and most expensive network? It appears contradictory and unproductive.

Nonetheless, holding an NFT on the Bitcoin blockchain is more secure than any other blockchain, but this has little utility.

Bitcoin NFTs are undoubtedly controversial. NFTs are strange and perhaps harmful to Bitcoin's mission. If Bitcoin NFTs are here to stay, I hope a sidechain or rollup solution will take over and leave the base chain alone.

Python Volatility-Based Catapult Indicator

As a catapult, this technical indicator uses three systems: Volatility (the fulcrum), Momentum (the propeller), and a Directional Filter (Acting as the support). The goal is to get a signal that predicts volatility acceleration and direction based on historical patterns. We want to know when the market will move. and where. This indicator outperforms standard indicators.

Knowledge must be accessible to everyone. This is why my new publications Contrarian Trading Strategies in Python and Trend Following Strategies in Python now include free PDF copies of my first three books (Therefore, purchasing one of the new books gets you 4 books in total). GitHub-hosted advanced indications and techniques are in the two new books above.

The Foundation: Volatility

The Catapult predicts significant changes with the 21-period Relative Volatility Index.

The Average True Range, Mean Absolute Deviation, and Standard Deviation all assess volatility. Standard Deviation will construct the Relative Volatility Index.

Standard Deviation is the most basic volatility. It underpins descriptive statistics and technical indicators like Bollinger Bands. Before calculating Standard Deviation, let's define Variance.

Variance is the squared deviations from the mean (a dispersion measure). We take the square deviations to compel the distance from the mean to be non-negative, then we take the square root to make the measure have the same units as the mean, comparing apples to apples (mean to standard deviation standard deviation). Variance formula:

As stated, standard deviation is:

# The function to add a number of columns inside an array
def adder(Data, times):
    
    for i in range(1, times + 1):
    
        new_col = np.zeros((len(Data), 1), dtype = float)
        Data = np.append(Data, new_col, axis = 1)
        
    return Data

# The function to delete a number of columns starting from an index
def deleter(Data, index, times):
    
    for i in range(1, times + 1):
    
        Data = np.delete(Data, index, axis = 1)
        
    return Data
    
# The function to delete a number of rows from the beginning
def jump(Data, jump):
    
    Data = Data[jump:, ]
    
    return Data

# Example of adding 3 empty columns to an array
my_ohlc_array = adder(my_ohlc_array, 3)

# Example of deleting the 2 columns after the column indexed at 3
my_ohlc_array = deleter(my_ohlc_array, 3, 2)

# Example of deleting the first 20 rows
my_ohlc_array = jump(my_ohlc_array, 20)

# Remember, OHLC is an abbreviation of Open, High, Low, and Close and it refers to the standard historical data file

def volatility(Data, lookback, what, where):
    
  for i in range(len(Data)):

     try:

        Data[i, where] = (Data[i - lookback + 1:i + 1, what].std())
     except IndexError:
        pass
        
  return Data

The RSI is the most popular momentum indicator, and for good reason—it excels in range markets. Its 0–100 range simplifies interpretation. Fame boosts its potential.

The more traders and portfolio managers look at the RSI, the more people will react to its signals, pushing market prices. Technical Analysis is self-fulfilling, therefore this theory is obvious yet unproven.

RSI is determined simply. Start with one-period pricing discrepancies. We must remove each closing price from the previous one. We then divide the smoothed average of positive differences by the smoothed average of negative differences. The RSI algorithm converts the Relative Strength from the last calculation into a value between 0 and 100.

def ma(Data, lookback, close, where): 
    
    Data = adder(Data, 1)
    
    for i in range(len(Data)):
           
            try:
                Data[i, where] = (Data[i - lookback + 1:i + 1, close].mean())
            
            except IndexError:
                pass
            
    # Cleaning
    Data = jump(Data, lookback)
    
    return Data
def ema(Data, alpha, lookback, what, where):
    
    alpha = alpha / (lookback + 1.0)
    beta  = 1 - alpha
    
    # First value is a simple SMA
    Data = ma(Data, lookback, what, where)
    
    # Calculating first EMA
    Data[lookback + 1, where] = (Data[lookback + 1, what] * alpha) + (Data[lookback, where] * beta)    
 
    # Calculating the rest of EMA
    for i in range(lookback + 2, len(Data)):
            try:
                Data[i, where] = (Data[i, what] * alpha) + (Data[i - 1, where] * beta)
        
            except IndexError:
                pass
            
    return Datadef rsi(Data, lookback, close, where, width = 1, genre = 'Smoothed'):
    
    # Adding a few columns
    Data = adder(Data, 7)
    
    # Calculating Differences
    for i in range(len(Data)):
        
        Data[i, where] = Data[i, close] - Data[i - width, close]
     
    # Calculating the Up and Down absolute values
    for i in range(len(Data)):
        
        if Data[i, where] > 0:
            
            Data[i, where + 1] = Data[i, where]
            
        elif Data[i, where] < 0:
            
            Data[i, where + 2] = abs(Data[i, where])
            
    # Calculating the Smoothed Moving Average on Up and Down
    absolute values        
                             
    lookback = (lookback * 2) - 1 # From exponential to smoothed
    Data = ema(Data, 2, lookback, where + 1, where + 3)
    Data = ema(Data, 2, lookback, where + 2, where + 4)
    
    # Calculating the Relative Strength
    Data[:, where + 5] = Data[:, where + 3] / Data[:, where + 4]
    
    # Calculate the Relative Strength Index
    Data[:, where + 6] = (100 - (100 / (1 + Data[:, where + 5])))  
    
    # Cleaning
    Data = deleter(Data, where, 6)
    Data = jump(Data, lookback)

    return Data

def relative_volatility_index(Data, lookback, close, where):

    # Calculating Volatility
    Data = volatility(Data, lookback, close, where)
    
    # Calculating the RSI on Volatility
    Data = rsi(Data, lookback, where, where + 1) 
    
    # Cleaning
    Data = deleter(Data, where, 1)
    
    return Data

The Arm Section: Speed

The Catapult predicts momentum direction using the 14-period Relative Strength Index.

As a reminder, the RSI ranges from 0 to 100. Two levels give contrarian signals:

• A positive response is anticipated when the market is deemed to have gone too far down at the oversold level 30, which is 30.

• When the market is deemed to have gone up too much, at overbought level 70, a bearish reaction is to be expected.

Comparing the RSI to 50 is another intriguing use. RSI above 50 indicates bullish momentum, while below 50 indicates negative momentum.

The direction-finding filter in the frame

The Catapult's directional filter uses the 200-period simple moving average to keep us trending. This keeps us sane and increases our odds.

Moving averages confirm and ride trends. Its simplicity and track record of delivering value to analysis make them the most popular technical indicator. They help us locate support and resistance, stops and targets, and the trend. Its versatility makes them essential trading tools.

This is the plain mean, employed in statistics and everywhere else in life. Simply divide the number of observations by their total values. Mathematically, it's:

We defined the moving average function above. Create the Catapult indication now.

Indicator of the Catapult

The indicator is a healthy mix of the three indicators:

• The first trigger will be provided by the 21-period Relative Volatility Index, which indicates that there will now be above average volatility and, as a result, it is possible for a directional shift.

• If the reading is above 50, the move is likely bullish, and if it is below 50, the move is likely bearish, according to the 14-period Relative Strength Index, which indicates the likelihood of the direction of the move.

• The likelihood of the move's direction will be strengthened by the 200-period simple moving average. When the market is above the 200-period moving average, we can infer that bullish pressure is there and that the upward trend will likely continue. Similar to this, if the market falls below the 200-period moving average, we recognize that there is negative pressure and that the downside is quite likely to continue.

lookback_rvi = 21
lookback_rsi = 14
lookback_ma  = 200
my_data = ma(my_data, lookback_ma, 3, 4)
my_data = rsi(my_data, lookback_rsi, 3, 5)
my_data = relative_volatility_index(my_data, lookback_rvi, 3, 6)

Two-handled overlay indicator Catapult. The first exhibits blue and green arrows for a buy signal, and the second shows blue and red for a sell signal.

The chart below shows recent EURUSD hourly values.

def signal(Data, rvi_col, signal):
    
    Data = adder(Data, 10)
        
    for i in range(len(Data)):
            
        if Data[i,     rvi_col] < 30 and \
           Data[i - 1, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 2, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 3, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 4, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 5, rvi_col] > 30:
               
               Data[i, signal] = 1
                           
    return Data

Signals are straightforward. The indicator can be utilized with other methods.

my_data = signal(my_data, 6, 7)

Lumiwealth shows how to develop all kinds of algorithms. I recommend their hands-on courses in algorithmic trading, blockchain, and machine learning.

Summary

To conclude, my goal is to contribute to objective technical analysis, which promotes more transparent methods and strategies that must be back-tested before implementation. Technical analysis will lose its reputation as subjective and unscientific.

After you find a trading method or approach, follow these steps:

• Put emotions aside and adopt an analytical perspective.

• Test it in the past in conditions and simulations taken from real life.

• Try improving it and performing a forward test if you notice any possibility.

• Transaction charges and any slippage simulation should always be included in your tests.

• Risk management and position sizing should always be included in your tests.

After checking the aforementioned, monitor the plan because market dynamics may change and render it unprofitable.

Generative AI hype: some thoughts

The sudden surge in "generative AI" startups and projects feels like the inverse of the recent "web3" boom. Both came from hyped-up pots. But while web3 hyped idealistic tech and an easy way to make money, generative AI hypes unsettling tech and questions whether it can be used to make money.

Web3 is technology looking for problems to solve, while generative AI is technology creating almost too many solutions. Web3 has been evangelists trying to solve old problems with new technology. As Generative AI evolves, users are resolving old problems in stunning new ways.

It's a jab at web3, but it's true. Web3's hype, including crypto, was unhealthy. Always expected a tech crash and shakeout. Tech that won't look like "web3" but will enhance "web2"

But that doesn't mean AI hype is healthy. There'll be plenty of bullshit here, too. As moths to a flame, hype attracts charlatans. Again, the difference is the different starting point. People want to use it. Try it.

With the beta launch of Dall-E 2 earlier this year, a new class of consumer product took off. Midjourney followed suit (despite having to jump through the Discord server hoops). Twelve more generative art projects. Lensa, Prisma Labs' generative AI self-portrait project, may have topped the hype (a startup which has actually been going after this general space for quite a while). This week, ChatGPT went off-topic.

This has a "fake-it-till-you-make-it" vibe. We give these projects too much credit because they create easy illusions. This also unlocks new forms of creativity. And faith in new possibilities.

As a user, it's thrilling. We're just getting started. These projects are not only fun to play with, but each week brings a new breakthrough. As an investor, it's all happening so fast, with so much hype (and ethical and societal questions), that no one knows how it will turn out. Web3's demand won't be the issue. Too much demand may cause servers to melt down, sending costs soaring. Companies will try to mix rapidly evolving tech to meet user demand and create businesses. Frustratingly difficult.

Anyway, I wanted an excuse to post some Lensa selfies.

These are really weird. I recognize them as me or a version of me, but I have no memory of them being taken. It's surreal, out-of-body. Uncanny Valley.

Sam Bankman Fried (SDBF) is a legendary con man. But the NYT might not tell you that...

Since SBF's empire was revealed to be a lie, mainstream news organizations and commentators have failed to give readers a straightforward assessment. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal have uncovered many key facts about the scandal, but they have also soft-peddled Bankman-Fried's intent and culpability.

It's clear that the FTX crypto exchange and Alameda Research committed fraud to steal money from users and investors. That’s why a recent New York Times interview was widely derided for seeming to frame FTX’s collapse as the result of mismanagement rather than malfeasance. A Wall Street Journal article lamented FTX's loss of charitable donations, bolstering Bankman's philanthropic pose. Matthew Yglesias, court chronicler of the neoliberal status quo, seemed to whitewash his own entanglements by crediting SBF's money with helping Democrats in 2020 – sidestepping the likelihood that the money was embezzled.

Many outlets have called what happened to FTX a "bank run" or a "run on deposits," but Bankman-Fried insists the company was overleveraged and disorganized. Both attempts to frame the fallout obscure the core issue: customer funds misused.

Because banks lend customer funds to generate returns, they can experience "bank runs." If everyone withdraws at once, they can experience a short-term cash crunch but there won't be a long-term problem.

Crypto exchanges like FTX aren't banks. They don't do bank-style lending, so a withdrawal surge shouldn't strain liquidity. FTX promised customers it wouldn't lend or use their crypto.

Alameda's balance sheet blurs SBF's crypto empire.

The funds were sent to Alameda Research, where they were apparently gambled away. This is massive theft. According to a bankruptcy document, up to 1 million customers could be affected.

In less than a month, reporting and the bankruptcy process have uncovered a laundry list of decisions and practices that would constitute financial fraud if FTX had been a U.S.-regulated entity, even without crypto-specific rules. These ploys may be litigated in U.S. courts if they enabled the theft of American property.

The list is very, very long.

The many crimes of Sam Bankman-Fried and FTX

At the heart of SBF's fraud are the deep and (literally) intimate ties between FTX and Alameda Research, a hedge fund he co-founded. An exchange makes money from transaction fees on user assets, but Alameda trades and invests its own funds.

Bankman-Fried called FTX and Alameda "wholly separate" and resigned as Alameda's CEO in 2019. The two operations were closely linked. Bankman-Fried and Alameda CEO Caroline Ellison were romantically linked.

These circumstances enabled SBF's sin.  Within days of FTX's first signs of weakness, it was clear the exchange was funneling customer assets to Alameda for trading, lending, and investing. Reuters reported on Nov. 12 that FTX sent $10 billion to Alameda. As much as $2 billion was believed to have disappeared after being sent to Alameda. Now the losses look worse.

It's unclear why those funds were sent to Alameda or when Bankman-Fried betrayed his depositors. On-chain analysis shows most FTX to Alameda transfers occurred in late 2021, and bankruptcy filings show both lost $3.7 billion in 2021.

SBF's companies lost millions before the 2022 crypto bear market. They may have stolen funds before Terra and Three Arrows Capital, which killed many leveraged crypto players.

FTT loans and prints

CoinDesk's report on Alameda's FTT holdings ignited FTX and Alameda Research. FTX created this instrument, but only a small portion was traded publicly; FTX and Alameda held the rest. These holdings were illiquid, meaning they couldn't be sold at market price. Bankman-Fried valued its stock at the fictitious price.

FTT tokens were reportedly used as collateral for loans, including FTX loans to Alameda. Close ties between FTX and Alameda made the FTT token harder or more expensive to use as collateral, reducing the risk to customer funds.

This use of an internal asset as collateral for loans between clandestinely related entities is similar to Enron's 1990s accounting fraud. These executives served 12 years in prison.

Alameda's margin liquidation exemption

Alameda Research had a "secret exemption" from FTX's liquidation and margin trading rules, according to legal filings by FTX's new CEO.

FTX, like other crypto platforms and some equity or commodity services, offered "margin" or loans for trades. These loans are usually collateralized, meaning borrowers put up other funds or assets. If a margin trade loses enough money, the exchange will sell the user's collateral to pay off the initial loan.

Keeping asset markets solvent requires liquidating bad margin positions. Exempting Alameda would give it huge advantages while exposing other FTX users to hidden risks. Alameda could have kept losing positions open while closing out competitors. Alameda could lose more on FTX than it could pay back, leaving a hole in customer funds.

The exemption is criminal in multiple ways. FTX was fraudulently marketed overall. Instead of a level playing field, there were many customers.

Above them all, with shotgun poised, was Alameda Research.

Alameda front-running FTX listings

Argus says there's circumstantial evidence that Alameda Research had insider knowledge of FTX's token listing plans. Alameda was able to buy large amounts of tokens before the listing and sell them after the price bump.

If true, these claims would be the most brazenly illegal of Alameda and FTX's alleged shenanigans. Even if the tokens aren't formally classified as securities, insider trading laws may apply.

In a similar case this year, an OpenSea employee was charged with wire fraud for allegedly insider trading. This employee faces 20 years in prison for front-running monkey JPEGs.

Huge loans to executives

Alameda Research reportedly lent FTX executives $4.1 billion, including massive personal loans. Bankman-Fried received $1 billion in personal loans and $2.3 billion for an entity he controlled, Paper Bird. Nishad Singh, director of engineering, was given $543 million, and FTX Digital Markets co-CEO Ryan Salame received $55 million.

FTX has more smoking guns than a Texas shooting range, but this one is the smoking bazooka – a sign of criminal intent. It's unclear how most of the personal loans were used, but liquidators will have to recoup the money.

The loans to Paper Bird were even more worrisome because they created another related third party to shuffle assets. Forbes speculates that some Paper Bird funds went to buy Binance's FTX stake, and Paper Bird committed hundreds of millions to outside investments.

FTX Inner Circle: Who's Who

That included many FTX-backed VC funds. Time will tell if this financial incest was criminal fraud. It fits Bankman-pattern Fried's of using secret flows, leverage, and funny money to inflate asset prices.

FTT or loan 'bailouts'

Also. As the crypto bear market continued in 2022, Bankman-Fried proposed bailouts for bankrupt crypto lenders BlockFi and Voyager Digital. CoinDesk was among those deceived, welcoming SBF as a J.P. Morgan-style sector backstop.

In a now-infamous interview with CNBC's "Squawk Box," Bankman-Fried referred to these decisions as bets that may or may not pay off.

But maybe not. Bloomberg's Matt Levine speculated that FTX backed BlockFi with FTT money. This Monopoly bailout may have been intended to hide FTX and Alameda liabilities that would have been exposed if BlockFi went bankrupt sooner. This ploy has no name, but it echoes other corporate frauds.

Secret bank purchase

Alameda Research invested $11.5 million in the tiny Farmington State Bank, doubling its net worth. As a non-U.S. entity and an investment firm, Alameda should have cleared regulatory hurdles before acquiring a U.S. bank.

In the context of FTX, the bank's stake becomes "ominous." Alameda and FTX could have done more shenanigans with bank control. Compare this to the Bank for Credit and Commerce International's failed attempts to buy U.S. banks. BCCI was even nefarious than FTX and wanted to buy U.S. banks to expand its money-laundering empire.

The mainstream's mistakes

These are complex and nuanced forms of fraud that echo traditional finance models. This obscurity helped Bankman-Fried masquerade as an honest player and likely kept coverage soft after the collapse.

Bankman-Fried had a scruffy, nerdy image, like Mark Zuckerberg and Adam Neumann. In interviews, he spoke nonsense about an industry full of jargon and complicated tech. Strategic donations and insincere ideological statements helped him gain political and social influence.

SBF' s'Effective' Altruism Blew Up FTX

Bankman-Fried has continued to muddy the waters with disingenuous letters, statements, interviews, and tweets since his con collapsed. He's tried to portray himself as a well-intentioned but naive kid who made some mistakes. This is a softer, more pernicious version of what Trump learned from mob lawyer Roy Cohn. Bankman-Fried doesn't "deny, deny, deny" but "confuse, evade, distort."

It's mostly worked. Kevin O'Leary, who plays an investor on "Shark Tank," repeats Bankman-SBF's counterfactuals.  O'Leary called Bankman-Fried a "savant" and "probably one of the most accomplished crypto traders in the world" in a Nov. 27 interview with Business Insider, despite recent data indicating immense trading losses even when times were good.

O'Leary's status as an FTX investor and former paid spokesperson explains his continued affection for Bankman-Fried despite contradictory evidence. He's not the only one promoting Bankman-Fried. The disgraced son of two Stanford law professors will defend himself at Wednesday's DealBook Summit.

SBF's fraud and theft rival those of Bernie Madoff and Jho Low. Whether intentionally or through malign ineptitude, the fraud echoes Worldcom and Enron.

The Perverse Impacts of Anti-Money-Laundering

The principals in all of those scandals wound up either sentenced to prison or on the run from the law. Sam Bankman-Fried clearly deserves to share their fate.

Read the full article here.