Fairness alternatives to selling below market clearing prices (or community sentiment, or fun)
When a seller has a limited supply of an item in high (or uncertain and possibly high) demand, they frequently set a price far below what "the market will bear." As a result, the item sells out quickly, with lucky buyers being those who tried to buy first. This has happened in the Ethereum ecosystem, particularly with NFT sales and token sales/ICOs. But this phenomenon is much older; concerts and restaurants frequently make similar choices, resulting in fast sell-outs or long lines.
Why do sellers do this? Economists have long wondered. A seller should sell at the market-clearing price if the amount buyers are willing to buy exactly equals the amount the seller has to sell. If the seller is unsure of the market-clearing price, they should sell at auction and let the market decide. So, if you want to sell something below market value, don't do it. It will hurt your sales and it will hurt your customers. The competitions created by non-price-based allocation mechanisms can sometimes have negative externalities that harm third parties, as we will see.
However, the prevalence of below-market-clearing pricing suggests that sellers do it for good reason. And indeed, as decades of research into this topic has shown, there often are. So, is it possible to achieve the same goals with less unfairness, inefficiency, and harm?
Selling at below market-clearing prices has large inefficiencies and negative externalities
An item that is sold at market value or at an auction allows someone who really wants it to pay the high price or bid high in the auction. So, if a seller sells an item below market value, some people will get it and others won't. But the mechanism deciding who gets the item isn't random, and it's not always well correlated with participant desire. It's not always about being the fastest at clicking buttons. Sometimes it means waking up at 2 a.m. (but 11 p.m. or even 2 p.m. elsewhere). Sometimes it's just a "auction by other means" that's more chaotic, less efficient, and has far more negative externalities.
There are many examples of this in the Ethereum ecosystem. Let's start with the 2017 ICO craze. For example, an ICO project would set the price of the token and a hard maximum for how many tokens they are willing to sell, and the sale would start automatically at some point in time. The sale ends when the cap is reached.
So what? In practice, these sales often ended in 30 seconds or less. Everyone would start sending transactions in as soon as (or just before) the sale started, offering higher and higher fees to encourage miners to include their transaction first. Instead of the token seller receiving revenue, miners receive it, and the sale prices out all other applications on-chain.
The most expensive transaction in the BAT sale set a fee of 580,000 gwei, paying a fee of $6,600 to get included in the sale.
Many ICOs after that tried various strategies to avoid these gas price auctions; one ICO notably had a smart contract that checked the transaction's gasprice and rejected it if it exceeded 50 gwei. But that didn't solve the issue. Buyers hoping to game the system sent many transactions hoping one would get through. An auction by another name, clogging the chain even more.
ICOs have recently lost popularity, but NFTs and NFT sales have risen in popularity. But the NFT space didn't learn from 2017; they do fixed-quantity sales just like ICOs (eg. see the mint function on lines 97-108 of this contract here). So what?
That's not the worst; some NFT sales have caused gas price spikes of up to 2000 gwei.
High gas prices from users fighting to get in first by sending higher and higher transaction fees. An auction renamed, pricing out all other applications on-chain for 15 minutes.
So why do sellers sometimes sell below market price?
Selling below market value is nothing new, and many articles, papers, and podcasts have written (and sometimes bitterly complained) about the unwillingness to use auctions or set prices to market-clearing levels.
Many of the arguments are the same for both blockchain (NFTs and ICOs) and non-blockchain examples (popular restaurants and concerts). Fairness and the desire not to exclude the poor, lose fans or create tension by being perceived as greedy are major concerns. The 1986 paper by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler explains how fairness and greed can influence these decisions. I recall that the desire to avoid perceptions of greed was also a major factor in discouraging the use of auction-like mechanisms in 2017.
Aside from fairness concerns, there is the argument that selling out and long lines create a sense of popularity and prestige, making the product more appealing to others. Long lines should have the same effect as high prices in a rational actor model, but this is not the case in reality. This applies to ICOs and NFTs as well as restaurants. Aside from increasing marketing value, some people find the game of grabbing a limited set of opportunities first before everyone else is quite entertaining.
But there are some blockchain-specific factors. One argument for selling ICO tokens below market value (and one that persuaded the OmiseGo team to adopt their capped sale strategy) is community dynamics. The first rule of community sentiment management is to encourage price increases. People are happy if they are "in the green." If the price drops below what the community members paid, they are unhappy and start calling you a scammer, possibly causing a social media cascade where everyone calls you a scammer.
This effect can only be avoided by pricing low enough that post-launch market prices will almost certainly be higher. But how do you do this without creating a rush for the gates that leads to an auction?
Interesting solutions
It's 2021. We have a blockchain. The blockchain is home to a powerful decentralized finance ecosystem, as well as a rapidly expanding set of non-financial tools. The blockchain also allows us to reset social norms. Where decades of economists yelling about "efficiency" failed, blockchains may be able to legitimize new uses of mechanism design. If we could use our more advanced tools to create an approach that more directly solves the problems, with fewer side effects, wouldn't that be better than fiddling with a coarse-grained one-dimensional strategy space of selling at market price versus below market price?
Begin with the goals. We'll try to cover ICOs, NFTs, and conference tickets (really a type of NFT) all at the same time.
1. Fairness: don't completely exclude low-income people from participation; give them a chance. The goal of token sales is to avoid high initial wealth concentration and have a larger and more diverse initial token holder community.
2. Don’t create races: Avoid situations where many people rush to do the same thing and only a few get in (this is the type of situation that leads to the horrible auctions-by-another-name that we saw above).
3. Don't require precise market knowledge: the mechanism should work even if the seller has no idea how much demand exists.
4. Fun: The process of participating in the sale should be fun and game-like, but not frustrating.
5. Give buyers positive expected returns: in the case of a token (or an NFT), buyers should expect price increases rather than decreases. This requires selling below market value.
Let's start with (1). From Ethereum's perspective, there is a simple solution. Use a tool designed for the job: proof of personhood protocols! Here's one quick idea:
Mechanism 1 Each participant (verified by ID) can buy up to ‘’X’’ tokens at price P, with the option to buy more at an auction.
With the per-person mechanism, buyers can get positive expected returns for the portion sold through the per-person mechanism, and the auction part does not require sellers to understand demand levels. Is it race-free? The number of participants buying through the per-person pool appears to be high. But what if the per-person pool isn't big enough to accommodate everyone?
Make the per-person allocation amount dynamic.
Mechanism 2 Each participant can deposit up to X tokens into a smart contract to declare interest. Last but not least, each buyer receives min(X, N / buyers) tokens, where N is the total sold through the per-person pool (some other amount can also be sold by auction). The buyer gets their deposit back if it exceeds the amount needed to buy their allocation.
No longer is there a race condition based on the number of buyers per person. No matter how high the demand, it's always better to join sooner rather than later.
Here's another idea if you like clever game mechanics with fancy quadratic formulas.
Mechanism 3 Each participant can buy X units at a price P X 2 up to a maximum of C tokens per buyer. C starts low and gradually increases until enough units are sold.
The quantity allocated to each buyer is theoretically optimal, though post-sale transfers will degrade this optimality over time. Mechanisms 2 and 3 appear to meet all of the above objectives. They're not perfect, but they're good starting points.
One more issue. For fixed and limited supply NFTs, the equilibrium purchased quantity per participant may be fractional (in mechanism 2, number of buyers > N, and in mechanism 3, setting C = 1 may already lead to over-subscription). With fractional sales, you can offer lottery tickets: if there are N items available, you have a chance of N/number of buyers of getting the item, otherwise you get a refund. For a conference, groups could bundle their lottery tickets to guarantee a win or a loss. The certainty of getting the item can be auctioned.
The bottom tier of "sponsorships" can be used to sell conference tickets at market rate. You may end up with a sponsor board full of people's faces, but is that okay? After all, John Lilic was on EthCC's sponsor board!
Simply put, if you want to be reliably fair to people, you need an input that explicitly measures people. Authentication protocols do this (and if desired can be combined with zero knowledge proofs to ensure privacy). So we should combine the efficiency of market and auction-based pricing with the equality of proof of personhood mechanics.
Answers to possible questions
Q: Won't people who don't care about your project buy the item and immediately resell it?
A: Not at first. Meta-games take time to appear in practice. If they do, making them untradeable for a while may help mitigate the damage. Using your face to claim that your previous account was hacked and that your identity, including everything in it, should be moved to another account works because proof-of-personhood identities are untradeable.
Q: What if I want to make my item available to a specific community?
A: Instead of ID, use proof of participation tokens linked to community events. Another option, also serving egalitarian and gamification purposes, is to encrypt items within publicly available puzzle solutions.
Q: How do we know they'll accept? Strange new mechanisms have previously been resisted.
A: Having economists write screeds about how they "should" accept a new mechanism that they find strange is difficult (or even "equity"). However, abrupt changes in context effectively reset people's expectations. So the blockchain space is the best place to try this. You could wait for the "metaverse", but it's possible that the best version will run on Ethereum anyway, so start now.
More on Web3 & Crypto
Sam Hickmann
3 years ago
A quick guide to formatting your text on INTΞGRITY
[06/20/2022 update] We have now implemented a powerful text editor, but you can still use markdown.
Markdown:
Headers
SYNTAX:
# This is a heading 1
## This is a heading 2
### This is a heading 3
#### This is a heading 4
RESULT:
This is a heading 1
This is a heading 2
This is a heading 3
This is a heading 4
Emphasis
SYNTAX:
**This text will be bold**
~~Strikethrough~~
*You **can** combine them*
RESULT:
This text will be italic
This text will be bold
You can combine them
Images
SYNTAX:
RESULT:
Videos
SYNTAX:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KXGZAEWzn0
RESULT:
Links
SYNTAX:
[Int3grity website](https://www.int3grity.com)
RESULT:
Tweets
SYNTAX:
https://twitter.com/samhickmann/status/1503800505864130561
RESULT:
Blockquotes
SYNTAX:
> Human beings face ever more complex and urgent problems, and their effectiveness in dealing with these problems is a matter that is critical to the stability and continued progress of society. \- Doug Engelbart, 1961
RESULT:
Human beings face ever more complex and urgent problems, and their effectiveness in dealing with these problems is a matter that is critical to the stability and continued progress of society. - Doug Engelbart, 1961
Inline code
SYNTAX:
Text inside `backticks` on a line will be formatted like code.
RESULT:
Text inside backticks on a line will be formatted like code.
Code blocks
SYNTAX:
'''js
function fancyAlert(arg) {
if(arg) {
$.facebox({div:'#foo'})
}
}
'''
RESULT:
function fancyAlert(arg) {
if(arg) {
$.facebox({div:'#foo'})
}
}
Maths
We support LaTex to typeset math. We recommend reading the full documentation on the official website
SYNTAX:
$$[x^n+y^n=z^n]$$
RESULT:
[x^n+y^n=z^n]
Tables
SYNTAX:
| header a | header b |
| ---- | ---- |
| row 1 col 1 | row 1 col 2 |
RESULT:
| header a | header b | header c |
|---|---|---|
| row 1 col 1 | row 1 col 2 | row 1 col 3 |
Onchain Wizard
3 years ago
Three Arrows Capital & Celsius Updates
I read 1k+ page 3AC liquidation documentation so you don't have to. Also sharing revised Celsius recovery plans.
3AC's liquidation documents:
Someone disclosed 3AC liquidation records in the BVI courts recently. I'll discuss the leak's timeline and other highlights.
Three Arrows Capital began trading traditional currencies in emerging markets in 2012. They switched to equities and crypto, then purely crypto in 2018.
By 2020, the firm had $703mm in net assets and $1.8bn in loans (these guys really like debt).
The firm's net assets under control reached $3bn in April 2022, according to the filings. 3AC had $600mm of LUNA/UST exposure before May 9th 2022, which put them over.
LUNA and UST go to zero quickly (I wrote about the mechanics of the blowup here). Kyle Davies, 3AC co-founder, told Blockchain.com on May 13 that they have $2.4bn in assets and $2.3bn NAV vs. $2bn in borrowings. As BTC and ETH plunged 33% and 50%, the company became insolvent by mid-2022.
3AC sent $32mm to Tai Ping Shen, a Cayman Islands business owned by Su Zhu and Davies' partner, Kelly Kaili Chen (who knows what is going on here).
3AC had borrowed over $3.5bn in notional principle, with Genesis ($2.4bn) and Voyager ($650mm) having the most exposure.
Genesis demanded $355mm in further collateral in June.
Deribit (another 3AC investment) called for $80 million in mid-June.
Even in mid-June, the corporation was trying to borrow more money to stay afloat. They approached Genesis for another $125mm loan (to pay another lender) and HODLnauts for BTC & ETH loans.
Pretty crazy. 3AC founders used borrowed money to buy a $50 million boat, according to the leak.
Su requesting for $5m + Chen Kaili Kelly asserting they loaned $65m unsecured to 3AC are identified as creditors.
Celsius:
This bankruptcy presentation shows the Celsius breakdown from March to July 14, 2022. From $22bn to $4bn, crypto assets plummeted from $14.6bn to $1.8bn (ouch). $16.5bn in user liabilities dropped to $4.72bn.
In my recent post, I examined if "forced selling" is over, with Celsius' crypto assets being a major overhang. In this presentation, it looks that Chapter 11 will provide clients the opportunity to accept cash at a discount or remain long crypto. Provided that a fresh source of money is unlikely to enter the Celsius situation, cash at a discount or crypto given to customers will likely remain a near-term market risk - cash at a discount will likely come from selling crypto assets, while customers who receive crypto could sell at any time. I'll share any Celsius updates I find.
Conclusion
Only Celsius and the Mt Gox BTC unlock remain as forced selling catalysts. While everything went through a "relief" pump, with ETH up 75% from the bottom and numerous alts multiples higher, there are still macro dangers to equities + risk assets. There's a lot of wealth waiting to be deployed in crypto ($153bn in stables), but fund managers are risk apprehensive (lower than 2008 levels).
We're hopefully over crypto's "bottom," with peak anxiety and forced selling behind us, but we may chop around.
To see the full article, click here.
Percy Bolmér
3 years ago
Ethereum No Longer Consumes A Medium-Sized Country's Electricity To Run
The Merge cut Ethereum's energy use by 99.5%.
The Crypto community celebrated on September 15, 2022. This day, Ethereum Merged. The entire blockchain successfully merged with the Beacon chain, and it was so smooth you barely noticed.
Many have waited, dreaded, and longed for this day.
Some investors feared the network would break down, while others envisioned a seamless merging.
Speculators predict a successful Merge will lead investors to Ethereum. This could boost Ethereum's popularity.
What Has Changed Since The Merge
The merging transitions Ethereum mainnet from PoW to PoS.
PoW sends a mathematical riddle to computers worldwide (miners). First miner to solve puzzle updates blockchain and is rewarded.
The puzzles sent are power-intensive to solve, so mining requires a lot of electricity. It's sent to every miner competing to solve it, requiring duplicate computation.
PoS allows investors to stake their coins to validate a new transaction. Instead of validating a whole block, you validate a transaction and get the fees.
You can validate instead of mine. A validator stakes 32 Ethereum. After staking, the validator can validate future blocks.
Once a validator validates a block, it's sent to a randomly selected group of other validators. This group verifies that a validator is not malicious and doesn't validate fake blocks.
This way, only one computer needs to solve or validate the transaction, instead of all miners. The validated block must be approved by a small group of validators, causing duplicate computation.
PoS is more secure because validating fake blocks results in slashing. You lose your bet tokens. If a validator signs a bad block or double-signs conflicting blocks, their ETH is burned.
Theoretically, Ethereum has one block every 12 seconds, so a validator forging a block risks burning 1 Ethereum for 12 seconds of transactions. This makes mistakes expensive and risky.
What Impact Does This Have On Energy Use?
Cryptocurrency is a natural calamity, sucking electricity and eating away at the earth one transaction at a time.
Many don't know the environmental impact of cryptocurrencies, yet it's tremendous.
A single Ethereum transaction used to use 200 kWh and leave a large carbon imprint. This update reduces global energy use by 0.2%.
Ethereum will submit a challenge to one validator, and that validator will forward it to randomly selected other validators who accept it.
This reduces the needed computing power.
They expect a 99.5% reduction, therefore a single transaction should cost 1 kWh.
Carbon footprint is 0.58 kgCO2, or 1,235 VISA transactions.
This is a big Ethereum blockchain update.
I love cryptocurrency and Mother Earth.
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William Anderson
3 years ago
When My Remote Leadership Skills Took Off
4 Ways To Manage Remote Teams & Employees
The wheels hit the ground as I landed in Rochester.
Our six-person satellite office was now part of my team.
Their manager only reported to me the day before, but I had my ticket booked ahead of time.
I had managed remote employees before but this was different. Engineers dialed into headquarters for every meeting.
So when I learned about the org chart change, I knew a strong first impression would set the tone for everything else.
I was either their boss, or their boss's boss, and I needed them to know I was committed.
Managing a fleet of satellite freelancers or multiple offices requires treating others as more than just a face behind a screen.
You must comprehend each remote team member's perspective and daily interactions.
The good news is that you can start using these techniques right now to better understand and elevate virtual team members.
1. Make Visits To Other Offices
If budgeted, visit and work from offices where teams and employees report to you. Only by living alongside them can one truly comprehend their problems with communication and other aspects of modern life.
2. Have Others Come to You
• Having remote, distributed, or satellite employees and teams visit headquarters every quarter or semi-quarterly allows the main office culture to rub off on them.
When remote team members visit, more people get to meet them, which builds empathy.
If you can't afford to fly everyone, at least bring remote managers or leaders. Hopefully they can resurrect some culture.
3. Weekly Work From Home
No home office policy?
Make one.
WFH is a team-building, problem-solving, and office-viewing opportunity.
For dial-in meetings, I started working from home on occasion.
It also taught me which teams “forget” or “skip” calls.
As a remote team member, you experience all the issues first hand.
This isn't as accurate for understanding teams in other offices, but it can be done at any time.
4. Increase Contact Even If It’s Just To Chat
Don't underestimate office banter.
Sometimes it's about bonding and trust, other times it's about business.
If you get all this information in real-time, please forward it.
Even if nothing critical is happening, call remote team members to check in and chat.
I guarantee that building relationships and rapport will increase both their job satisfaction and yours.
Sanjay Priyadarshi
2 years ago
Using Ruby code, a programmer created a $48,000,000,000 product that Elon Musk admired.
Unexpected Success
Shopify CEO and co-founder Tobias Lutke. Shopify is worth $48 billion.
World-renowned entrepreneur Tobi
Tobi never expected his first online snowboard business to become a multimillion-dollar software corporation.
Tobi founded Shopify to establish a 20-person company.
The publicly traded corporation employs over 10,000 people.
Here's Tobi Lutke's incredible story.
Elon Musk tweeted his admiration for the Shopify creator.
30-October-2019.
Musk praised Shopify founder Tobi Lutke on Twitter.
Happened:
Explore this programmer's journey.
What difficulties did Tobi experience as a young child?
Germany raised Tobi.
Tobi's parents realized he was smart but had trouble learning as a toddler.
Tobi was learning disabled.
Tobi struggled with school tests.
Tobi's learning impairments were undiagnosed.
Tobi struggled to read as a dyslexic.
Tobi also found school boring.
Germany's curriculum didn't inspire Tobi's curiosity.
“The curriculum in Germany was taught like here are all the solutions you might find useful later in life, spending very little time talking about the problem…If I don’t understand the problem I’m trying to solve, it’s very hard for me to learn about a solution to a problem.”
Studying computer programming
After tenth grade, Tobi decided school wasn't for him and joined a German apprenticeship program.
This curriculum taught Tobi software engineering.
He was an apprentice in a small Siemens subsidiary team.
Tobi worked with rebellious Siemens employees.
Team members impressed Tobi.
Tobi joined the team for this reason.
Tobi was pleased to get paid to write programming all day.
His life could not have been better.
Devoted to snowboarding
Tobi loved snowboarding.
He drove 5 hours to ski at his folks' house.
His friends traveled to the US to snowboard when he was older.
However, the cheap dollar conversion rate led them to Canada.
2000.
Tobi originally decided to snowboard instead than ski.
Snowboarding captivated him in Canada.
On the trip to Canada, Tobi encounters his wife.
Tobi meets his wife Fiona McKean on his first Canadian ski trip.
They maintained in touch after the trip.
Fiona moved to Germany after graduating.
Tobi was a startup coder.
Fiona found work in Germany.
Her work included editing, writing, and academics.
“We lived together for 10 months and then she told me that she need to go back for the master's program.”
With Fiona, Tobi immigrated to Canada.
Fiona invites Tobi.
Tobi agreed to move to Canada.
Programming helped Tobi move in with his girlfriend.
Tobi was an excellent programmer, therefore what he did in Germany could be done anywhere.
He worked remotely for his German employer in Canada.
Tobi struggled with remote work.
Due to poor communication.
No slack, so he used email.
Programmers had trouble emailing.
Tobi's startup was developing a browser.
After the dot-com crash, individuals left that startup.
It ended.
Tobi didn't intend to work for any major corporations.
Tobi left his startup.
He believed he had important skills for any huge corporation.
He refused to join a huge corporation.
Because of Siemens.
Tobi learned to write professional code and about himself while working at Siemens in Germany.
Siemens culture was odd.
Employees were distrustful.
Siemens' rigorous dress code implies that the corporation doesn't trust employees' attire.
It wasn't Tobi's place.
“There was so much bad with it that it just felt wrong…20-year-old Tobi would not have a career there.”
Focused only on snowboarding
Tobi lived in Ottawa with his girlfriend.
Canada is frigid in winter.
Ottawa's winters last.
Almost half a year.
Tobi wanted to do something worthwhile now.
So he snowboarded.
Tobi began snowboarding seriously.
He sought every snowboarding knowledge.
He researched the greatest snowboarding gear first.
He created big spreadsheets for snowboard-making technologies.
Tobi grew interested in selling snowboards while researching.
He intended to sell snowboards online.
He had no choice but to start his own company.
A small local company offered Tobi a job.
Interested.
He must sign papers to join the local company.
He needed a work permit when he signed the documents.
Tobi had no work permit.
He was allowed to stay in Canada while applying for permanent residency.
“I wasn’t illegal in the country, but my state didn’t give me a work permit. I talked to a lawyer and he told me it’s going to take a while until I get a permanent residency.”
Tobi's lawyer told him he cannot get a work visa without permanent residence.
His lawyer said something else intriguing.
Tobis lawyer advised him to start a business.
Tobi declined this local company's job offer because of this.
Tobi considered opening an internet store with his technical skills.
He sold snowboards online.
“I was thinking of setting up an online store software because I figured that would exist and use it as a way to sell snowboards…make money while snowboarding and hopefully have a good life.”
What brought Tobi and his co-founder together, and how did he support Tobi?
Tobi lived with his girlfriend's parents.
In Ottawa, Tobi encounters Scott Lake.
Scott was Tobis girlfriend's family friend and worked for Tobi's future employer.
Scott and Tobi snowboarded.
Tobi pitched Scott his snowboard sales software idea.
Scott liked the idea.
They planned a business together.
“I was looking after the technology and Scott was dealing with the business side…It was Scott who ended up developing relationships with vendors and doing all the business set-up.”
Issues they ran into when attempting to launch their business online
Neither could afford a long-term lease.
That prompted their online business idea.
They would open a store.
Tobi anticipated opening an internet store in a week.
Tobi seeks open-source software.
Most existing software was pricey.
Tobi and Scott couldn't afford pricey software.
“In 2004, I was sitting in front of my computer absolutely stunned realising that we hadn’t figured out how to create software for online stores.”
They required software to:
to upload snowboard images to the website.
people to look up the types of snowboards that were offered on the website. There must be a search feature in the software.
Online users transmit payments, and the merchant must receive them.
notifying vendors of the recently received order.
No online selling software existed at the time.
Online credit card payments were difficult.
How did they advance the software while keeping expenses down?
Tobi and Scott needed money to start selling snowboards.
Tobi and Scott funded their firm with savings.
“We both put money into the company…I think the capital we had was around CAD 20,000(Canadian Dollars).”
Despite investing their savings.
They minimized costs.
They tried to conserve.
No office rental.
They worked in several coffee shops.
Tobi lived rent-free at his girlfriend's parents.
He installed software in coffee cafes.
How were the software issues handled?
Tobi found no online snowboard sales software.
Two choices remained:
Change your mind and try something else.
Use his programming expertise to produce something that will aid in the expansion of this company.
Tobi knew he was the sole programmer working on such a project from the start.
“I had this realisation that I’m going to be the only programmer who has ever worked on this, so I don’t have to choose something that lots of people know. I can choose just the best tool for the job…There is been this programming language called Ruby which I just absolutely loved ”
Ruby was open-source and only had Japanese documentation.
Latin is the source code.
Tobi used Ruby twice.
He assumed he could pick the tool this time.
Why not build with Ruby?
How did they find their first time operating a business?
Tobi writes applications in Ruby.
He wrote the initial software version in 2.5 months.
Tobi and Scott founded Snowdevil to sell snowboards.
Tobi coded for 16 hours a day.
His lifestyle was unhealthy.
He enjoyed pizza and coke.
“I would never recommend this to anyone, but at the time there was nothing more interesting to me in the world.”
Their initial purchase and encounter with it
Tobi worked in cafes then.
“I was working in a coffee shop at this time and I remember everything about that day…At some time, while I was writing the software, I had to type the email that the software would send to tell me about the order.”
Tobi recalls everything.
He checked the order on his laptop at the coffee shop.
Pennsylvanian ordered snowboard.
Tobi walked home and called Scott. Tobi told Scott their first order.
They loved the order.
How were people made aware about Snowdevil?
2004 was very different.
Tobi and Scott attempted simple website advertising.
Google AdWords was new.
Ad clicks cost 20 cents.
Online snowboard stores were scarce at the time.
Google ads propelled the snowdevil brand.
Snowdevil prospered.
They swiftly recouped their original investment in the snowboard business because to its high profit margin.
Tobi and Scott struggled with inventories.
“Snowboards had really good profit margins…Our biggest problem was keeping inventory and getting it back…We were out of stock all the time.”
Selling snowboards returned their investment and saved them money.
They did not appoint a business manager.
They accomplished everything alone.
Sales dipped in the spring, but something magical happened.
Spring sales plummeted.
They considered stocking different boards.
They naturally wanted to add boards and grow the business.
However, magic occurred.
Tobi coded and improved software while running Snowdevil.
He modified software constantly. He wanted speedier software.
He experimented to make the software more resilient.
Tobi received emails requesting the Snowdevil license.
They intended to create something similar.
“I didn’t stop programming, I was just like Ok now let me try things, let me make it faster and try different approaches…Increasingly I got people sending me emails and asking me If I would like to licence snowdevil to them. People wanted to start something similar.”
Software or skateboards, your choice
Scott and Tobi had to choose a hobby in 2005.
They might sell alternative boards or use software.
The software was a no-brainer from demand.
Daniel Weinand is invited to join Tobi's business.
Tobis German best friend is Daniel.
Tobi and Scott chose to use the software.
Tobi and Scott kept the software service.
Tobi called Daniel to invite him to Canada to collaborate.
Scott and Tobi had quit snowboarding until then.
How was Shopify launched, and whence did the name come from?
The three chose Shopify.
Named from two words.
First:
Shop
Final part:
Simplify
Shopify
Shopify's crew has always had one goal:
creating software that would make it simple and easy for people to launch online storefronts.
Launched Shopify after raising money for the first time.
Shopify began fundraising in 2005.
First, they borrowed from family and friends.
They needed roughly $200k to run the company efficiently.
$200k was a lot then.
When questioned why they require so much money. Tobi told them to trust him with their goals. The team raised seed money from family and friends.
Shopify.com has a landing page. A demo of their goal was on the landing page.
In 2006, Shopify had about 4,000 emails.
Shopify rented an Ottawa office.
“We sent a blast of emails…Some people signed up just to try it out, which was exciting.”
How things developed after Scott left the company
Shopify co-founder Scott Lake left in 2008.
Scott was CEO.
“He(Scott) realized at some point that where the software industry was going, most of the people who were the CEOs were actually the highly technical person on the founding team.”
Scott leaving the company worried Tobi.
Tobis worried about finding a new CEO.
To Tobi:
A great VC will have the network to identify the perfect CEO for your firm.
Tobi started visiting Silicon Valley to meet with venture capitalists to recruit a CEO.
Initially visiting Silicon Valley
Tobi came to Silicon Valley to start a 20-person company.
This company creates eCommerce store software.
Tobi never wanted a big corporation. He desired a fulfilling existence.
“I stayed in a hostel in the Bay Area. I had one roommate who was also a computer programmer. I bought a bicycle on Craiglist. I was there for a week, but ended up staying two and a half weeks.”
Tobi arrived unprepared.
When venture capitalists asked him business questions.
He answered few queries.
Tobi didn't comprehend VC meetings' terminology.
He wrote the terms down and looked them up.
Some were fascinated after he couldn't answer all these queries.
“I ended up getting the kind of term sheets people dream about…All the offers were conditional on moving our company to Silicon Valley.”
Canada received Tobi.
He wanted to consult his team before deciding. Shopify had five employees at the time.
2008.
A global recession greeted Tobi in Canada. The recession hurt the market.
His term sheets were useless.
The economic downturn in the world provided Shopify with a fantastic opportunity.
The global recession caused significant job losses.
Fired employees had several ideas.
They wanted online stores.
Entrepreneurship was desired. They wanted to quit work.
People took risks and tried new things during the global slump.
Shopify subscribers skyrocketed during the recession.
“In 2009, the company reached neutral cash flow for the first time…We were in a position to think about long-term investments, such as infrastructure projects.”
Then, Tobi Lutke became CEO.
How did Tobi perform as the company's CEO?
“I wasn’t good. My team was very patient with me, but I had a lot to learn…It’s a very subtle job.”
2009–2010.
Tobi limited the company's potential.
He deliberately restrained company growth.
Tobi had one costly problem:
Whether Shopify is a venture or a lifestyle business.
The company's annual revenue approached $1 million.
Tobi battled with the firm and himself despite good revenue.
His wife was supportive, but the responsibility was crushing him.
“It’s a crushing responsibility…People had families and kids…I just couldn’t believe what was going on…My father-in-law gave me money to cover the payroll and it was his life-saving.”
Throughout this trip, everyone supported Tobi.
They believed it.
$7 million in donations received
Tobi couldn't decide if this was a lifestyle or a business.
Shopify struggled with marketing then.
Later, Tobi tried 5 marketing methods.
He told himself that if any marketing method greatly increased their growth, he would call it a venture, otherwise a lifestyle.
The Shopify crew brainstormed and voted on marketing concepts.
Tested.
“Every single idea worked…We did Adwords, published a book on the concept, sponsored a podcast and all the ones we tracked worked.”
To Silicon Valley once more
Shopify marketing concepts worked once.
Tobi returned to Silicon Valley to pitch investors.
He raised $7 million, valuing Shopify at $25 million.
All investors had board seats.
“I find it very helpful…I always had a fantastic relationship with everyone who’s invested in my company…I told them straight that I am not going to pretend I know things, I want you to help me.”
Tobi developed skills via running Shopify.
Shopify had 20 employees.
Leaving his wife's parents' home
Tobi left his wife's parents in 2014.
Tobi had a child.
Shopify has 80,000 customers and 300 staff in 2013.
Public offering in 2015
Shopify investors went public in 2015.
Shopify powers 4.1 million e-Commerce sites.
Shopify stores are 65% US-based.
It is currently valued at $48 billion.
Sammy Abdullah
3 years ago
R&D, S&M, and G&A expense ratios for SaaS
SaaS spending is 40/40/20. 40% of operating expenses should be R&D, 40% sales and marketing, and 20% G&A. We wanted to see the statistics behind the rules of thumb. Since October 2017, 73 SaaS startups have gone public. Perhaps the rule of thumb should be 30/50/20. The data is below.
30/50/20. R&D accounts for 26% of opex, sales and marketing 48%, and G&A 22%. We think R&D/S&M/G&A should be 30/50/20.
There are outliers. There are exceptions to rules of thumb. Dropbox spent 45% on R&D whereas Zoom spent 13%. Zoom spent 73% on S&M, Dropbox 37%, and Bill.com 28%. Snowflake spent 130% of revenue on S&M, while their EBITDA margin is -192%.
G&A shouldn't stand out. Minimize G&A spending. Priorities should be product development and sales. Cloudflare, Sendgrid, Snowflake, and Palantir spend 36%, 34%, 37%, and 43% on G&A.
Another myth is that COGS is 20% of revenue. Median and averages are 29%.
Where is the profitability? Data-driven operating income calculations were simplified (Revenue COGS R&D S&M G&A). 20 of 73 IPO businesses reported operational income. Median and average operating income margins are -21% and -27%.
As long as you're growing fast, have outstanding retention, and marquee clients, you can burn cash since recurring income that doesn't churn is a valuable annuity.
The data was compelling overall. 30/50/20 is the new 40/40/20 for more established SaaS enterprises, unprofitability is alright as long as your business is expanding, and COGS can be somewhat more than 20% of revenue.