Sam Bankman Fried (SDBF) is a legendary con man. But the NYT might not tell you that...

Since SBF's empire was revealed to be a lie, mainstream news organizations and commentators have failed to give readers a straightforward assessment. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal have uncovered many key facts about the scandal, but they have also soft-peddled Bankman-Fried's intent and culpability.

It's clear that the FTX crypto exchange and Alameda Research committed fraud to steal money from users and investors. That’s why a recent New York Times interview was widely derided for seeming to frame FTX’s collapse as the result of mismanagement rather than malfeasance. A Wall Street Journal article lamented FTX's loss of charitable donations, bolstering Bankman's philanthropic pose. Matthew Yglesias, court chronicler of the neoliberal status quo, seemed to whitewash his own entanglements by crediting SBF's money with helping Democrats in 2020 – sidestepping the likelihood that the money was embezzled.

Many outlets have called what happened to FTX a "bank run" or a "run on deposits," but Bankman-Fried insists the company was overleveraged and disorganized. Both attempts to frame the fallout obscure the core issue: customer funds misused.

Because banks lend customer funds to generate returns, they can experience "bank runs." If everyone withdraws at once, they can experience a short-term cash crunch but there won't be a long-term problem.

Crypto exchanges like FTX aren't banks. They don't do bank-style lending, so a withdrawal surge shouldn't strain liquidity. FTX promised customers it wouldn't lend or use their crypto.

Alameda's balance sheet blurs SBF's crypto empire.

The funds were sent to Alameda Research, where they were apparently gambled away. This is massive theft. According to a bankruptcy document, up to 1 million customers could be affected.

In less than a month, reporting and the bankruptcy process have uncovered a laundry list of decisions and practices that would constitute financial fraud if FTX had been a U.S.-regulated entity, even without crypto-specific rules. These ploys may be litigated in U.S. courts if they enabled the theft of American property.

The list is very, very long.

The many crimes of Sam Bankman-Fried and FTX

At the heart of SBF's fraud are the deep and (literally) intimate ties between FTX and Alameda Research, a hedge fund he co-founded. An exchange makes money from transaction fees on user assets, but Alameda trades and invests its own funds.

Bankman-Fried called FTX and Alameda "wholly separate" and resigned as Alameda's CEO in 2019. The two operations were closely linked. Bankman-Fried and Alameda CEO Caroline Ellison were romantically linked.

These circumstances enabled SBF's sin.  Within days of FTX's first signs of weakness, it was clear the exchange was funneling customer assets to Alameda for trading, lending, and investing. Reuters reported on Nov. 12 that FTX sent $10 billion to Alameda. As much as $2 billion was believed to have disappeared after being sent to Alameda. Now the losses look worse.

It's unclear why those funds were sent to Alameda or when Bankman-Fried betrayed his depositors. On-chain analysis shows most FTX to Alameda transfers occurred in late 2021, and bankruptcy filings show both lost $3.7 billion in 2021.

SBF's companies lost millions before the 2022 crypto bear market. They may have stolen funds before Terra and Three Arrows Capital, which killed many leveraged crypto players.

FTT loans and prints

CoinDesk's report on Alameda's FTT holdings ignited FTX and Alameda Research. FTX created this instrument, but only a small portion was traded publicly; FTX and Alameda held the rest. These holdings were illiquid, meaning they couldn't be sold at market price. Bankman-Fried valued its stock at the fictitious price.

FTT tokens were reportedly used as collateral for loans, including FTX loans to Alameda. Close ties between FTX and Alameda made the FTT token harder or more expensive to use as collateral, reducing the risk to customer funds.

This use of an internal asset as collateral for loans between clandestinely related entities is similar to Enron's 1990s accounting fraud. These executives served 12 years in prison.

Alameda's margin liquidation exemption

Alameda Research had a "secret exemption" from FTX's liquidation and margin trading rules, according to legal filings by FTX's new CEO.

FTX, like other crypto platforms and some equity or commodity services, offered "margin" or loans for trades. These loans are usually collateralized, meaning borrowers put up other funds or assets. If a margin trade loses enough money, the exchange will sell the user's collateral to pay off the initial loan.

Keeping asset markets solvent requires liquidating bad margin positions. Exempting Alameda would give it huge advantages while exposing other FTX users to hidden risks. Alameda could have kept losing positions open while closing out competitors. Alameda could lose more on FTX than it could pay back, leaving a hole in customer funds.

The exemption is criminal in multiple ways. FTX was fraudulently marketed overall. Instead of a level playing field, there were many customers.

Above them all, with shotgun poised, was Alameda Research.

Alameda front-running FTX listings

Argus says there's circumstantial evidence that Alameda Research had insider knowledge of FTX's token listing plans. Alameda was able to buy large amounts of tokens before the listing and sell them after the price bump.

If true, these claims would be the most brazenly illegal of Alameda and FTX's alleged shenanigans. Even if the tokens aren't formally classified as securities, insider trading laws may apply.

In a similar case this year, an OpenSea employee was charged with wire fraud for allegedly insider trading. This employee faces 20 years in prison for front-running monkey JPEGs.

Huge loans to executives

Alameda Research reportedly lent FTX executives $4.1 billion, including massive personal loans. Bankman-Fried received $1 billion in personal loans and $2.3 billion for an entity he controlled, Paper Bird. Nishad Singh, director of engineering, was given $543 million, and FTX Digital Markets co-CEO Ryan Salame received $55 million.

FTX has more smoking guns than a Texas shooting range, but this one is the smoking bazooka – a sign of criminal intent. It's unclear how most of the personal loans were used, but liquidators will have to recoup the money.

The loans to Paper Bird were even more worrisome because they created another related third party to shuffle assets. Forbes speculates that some Paper Bird funds went to buy Binance's FTX stake, and Paper Bird committed hundreds of millions to outside investments.

FTX Inner Circle: Who's Who

That included many FTX-backed VC funds. Time will tell if this financial incest was criminal fraud. It fits Bankman-pattern Fried's of using secret flows, leverage, and funny money to inflate asset prices.

FTT or loan 'bailouts'

Also. As the crypto bear market continued in 2022, Bankman-Fried proposed bailouts for bankrupt crypto lenders BlockFi and Voyager Digital. CoinDesk was among those deceived, welcoming SBF as a J.P. Morgan-style sector backstop.

In a now-infamous interview with CNBC's "Squawk Box," Bankman-Fried referred to these decisions as bets that may or may not pay off.

But maybe not. Bloomberg's Matt Levine speculated that FTX backed BlockFi with FTT money. This Monopoly bailout may have been intended to hide FTX and Alameda liabilities that would have been exposed if BlockFi went bankrupt sooner. This ploy has no name, but it echoes other corporate frauds.

Secret bank purchase

Alameda Research invested $11.5 million in the tiny Farmington State Bank, doubling its net worth. As a non-U.S. entity and an investment firm, Alameda should have cleared regulatory hurdles before acquiring a U.S. bank.

In the context of FTX, the bank's stake becomes "ominous." Alameda and FTX could have done more shenanigans with bank control. Compare this to the Bank for Credit and Commerce International's failed attempts to buy U.S. banks. BCCI was even nefarious than FTX and wanted to buy U.S. banks to expand its money-laundering empire.

The mainstream's mistakes

These are complex and nuanced forms of fraud that echo traditional finance models. This obscurity helped Bankman-Fried masquerade as an honest player and likely kept coverage soft after the collapse.

Bankman-Fried had a scruffy, nerdy image, like Mark Zuckerberg and Adam Neumann. In interviews, he spoke nonsense about an industry full of jargon and complicated tech. Strategic donations and insincere ideological statements helped him gain political and social influence.

SBF' s'Effective' Altruism Blew Up FTX

Bankman-Fried has continued to muddy the waters with disingenuous letters, statements, interviews, and tweets since his con collapsed. He's tried to portray himself as a well-intentioned but naive kid who made some mistakes. This is a softer, more pernicious version of what Trump learned from mob lawyer Roy Cohn. Bankman-Fried doesn't "deny, deny, deny" but "confuse, evade, distort."

It's mostly worked. Kevin O'Leary, who plays an investor on "Shark Tank," repeats Bankman-SBF's counterfactuals.  O'Leary called Bankman-Fried a "savant" and "probably one of the most accomplished crypto traders in the world" in a Nov. 27 interview with Business Insider, despite recent data indicating immense trading losses even when times were good.

O'Leary's status as an FTX investor and former paid spokesperson explains his continued affection for Bankman-Fried despite contradictory evidence. He's not the only one promoting Bankman-Fried. The disgraced son of two Stanford law professors will defend himself at Wednesday's DealBook Summit.

SBF's fraud and theft rival those of Bernie Madoff and Jho Low. Whether intentionally or through malign ineptitude, the fraud echoes Worldcom and Enron.

The Perverse Impacts of Anti-Money-Laundering

The principals in all of those scandals wound up either sentenced to prison or on the run from the law. Sam Bankman-Fried clearly deserves to share their fate.

Read the full article here.

ERC165 (or EIP-165) is a standard utilized by various open-source smart contracts like Open Zeppelin or Aavegotchi.

What's it? You must implement? Why do we need it? I'll describe the standard and answer any queries.

What is ERC165

ERC165 detects and publishes smart contract interfaces. Meaning? It standardizes how interfaces are recognized, how to detect if they implement ERC165, and how a contract publishes the interfaces it implements. How does it work?

Why use ERC165? Sometimes it's useful to know which interfaces a contract implements, and which version.

Identifying interfaces

An interface function's selector. This verifies an ABI function. XORing all function selectors defines an interface in this standard. The following code demonstrates.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENCED
pragma solidity >=0.8.0 <0.9.0;

interface Solidity101 {
    function hello() external pure;
    function world(int) external pure;
}

contract Selector {
    function calculateSelector() public pure returns (bytes4) {
        Solidity101 i;
        return i.hello.selector ^ i.world.selector;
        // Returns 0xc6be8b58
    }

    function getHelloSelector() public pure returns (bytes4) {
        Solidity101 i;
        return i.hello.selector;
        // Returns 0x19ff1d21
    }

    function getWorldSelector() public pure returns (bytes4) {
        Solidity101 i;
        return i.world.selector;
        // Returns 0xdf419679
    }
}

This code isn't necessary to understand function selectors and how an interface's selector can be determined from the functions it implements.

Run that sample in Remix to see how interface function modifications affect contract function output.

Contracts publish their implemented interfaces.

We can identify interfaces. Now we must disclose the interfaces we're implementing. First, import IERC165 like so.

pragma solidity ^0.4.20;

interface ERC165 {
    /// @notice Query if a contract implements an interface
    /// @param interfaceID The interface identifier, as specified in ERC-165
    /// @dev Interface identification is specified in ERC-165. 
    /// @return `true` if the contract implements `interfaceID` and
    ///  `interfaceID` is not 0xffffffff, `false` otherwise
    function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceID) external view returns (bool);
}

We still need to build this interface in our smart contract. ERC721 from OpenZeppelin is a good example.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.5.0) (token/ERC721/ERC721.sol)

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

import "./IERC721.sol";
import "./extensions/IERC721Metadata.sol";
import "../../utils/introspection/ERC165.sol";
// ...

contract ERC721 is Context, ERC165, IERC721, IERC721Metadata {
  // ...

  function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceId) public view virtual override(ERC165, IERC165) returns (bool) {
    return
      interfaceId == type(IERC721).interfaceId ||
      interfaceId == type(IERC721Metadata).interfaceId ||
      super.supportsInterface(interfaceId);
  }
  
  // ...
}

I deleted unnecessary code. The smart contract imports ERC165, IERC721 and IERC721Metadata. The is keyword at smart contract declaration implements all three.

Kind (interface).

Note that type(interface).interfaceId returns the same as the interface selector.

We override supportsInterface in the smart contract to return a boolean that checks if interfaceId is the same as one of the implemented contracts.

Super.supportsInterface() calls ERC165 code. Checks if interfaceId is IERC165.

function supportsInterface(bytes4 interfaceId) public view virtual override returns (bool) {
    return interfaceId == type(IERC165).interfaceId;
}

So, if we run supportsInterface with an interfaceId, our contract function returns true if it's implemented and false otherwise. True for IERC721, IERC721Metadata, andIERC165.

Conclusion

I hope this post has helped you understand and use ERC165 and why it's employed.

Have a great day, thanks for reading!

Learn or earn

In 2020, I started software engineering. My base wage has progressed as follows:

Amazon (2020): $112,000

Microsoft (2021): $123,000

Google (2022): $169,000

I didn't major in math, but those jumps appear more than a 7% wage increase. Here's a deeper look at the three.

The Three Categories of Compensation

Most software engineering compensation packages at IT organizations follow this format.

Minimum Salary

Base salary is pre-tax income. Most organizations give a base pay. This is paid biweekly, twice monthly, or monthly.

Recruiting Bonus

Sign-On incentives are one-time rewards to new hires. Companies need an incentive to switch. If you leave early, you must pay back the whole cost or a pro-rated amount.

Equity

Equity is complex and requires its own post. A company will promise to give you a certain amount of company stock but when you get it depends on your offer. 25% per year for 4 years, then it's gone.

If a company gives you $100,000 and distributes 25% every year for 4 years, expect $25,000 worth of company stock in your stock brokerage on your 1 year work anniversary.

Performance Bonus

Tech offers may include yearly performance bonuses. Depends on performance and funding. I've only seen 0-20%.

Engineers' overall compensation usually includes:

Base Salary + Sign-On + (Total Equity)/4 + Average Performance Bonus

Amazon: (TC: 150k)

Base Pay System

Amazon pays Seattle employees monthly on the first work day. I'd rather have my money sooner than later, even if it saves processing and pay statements.

The company upped its base pay cap from $160,000 to $350,000 to compete with other tech companies.

Performance Bonus

Amazon has no performance bonus, so you can work as little or as much as you like and get paid the same. Amazon is savvy to avoid promising benefits it can't deliver.

Sign-On Bonus

Amazon gives two two-year sign-up bonuses. First-year workers could receive $20,000 and second-year workers $15,000. It's probably to make up for the company's strange equity structure.

If you leave during the first year, you'll owe the entire money and a prorated amount for the second year bonus.

Equity

Most organizations prefer a 25%, 25%, 25%, 25% equity structure. Amazon takes a different approach with end-heavy equity:

• the first year, 5%

• 15% after one year.

• 20% then every six months

We thought it was constructed this way to keep staff longer.

Microsoft (TC: 185k)

Base Pay System

Microsoft paid biweekly.

Gainful Performance

My offer letter suggested a 0%-20% performance bonus. Everyone will be satisfied with a 10% raise at year's end.

But misleading press where the budget for the bonus is doubled can upset some employees because they won't earn double their expected bonus. Still barely 10% for 2022 average.

Sign-On Bonus

Microsoft's sign-on bonus is a one-time payout. The contract can require 2-year employment. You must negotiate 1 year. It's pro-rated, so that's fair.

Equity

Microsoft is one of those companies that has standard 25% equity structure. Except if you’re a new graduate.

In that case it’ll be

• 25% six months later

• 25% each year following that

New grads will acquire equity in 3.5 years, not 4. I'm guessing it's to keep new grads around longer.

Google (TC: 300k)

Base Pay Structure

Google pays biweekly.

Performance Bonus

Google's offer letter specifies a 15% bonus. It's wonderful there's no cap, but I might still get 0%. A little more than Microsoft’s 10% and a lot more than Amazon’s 0%.

Sign-On Bonus

Google gave a 1-year sign-up incentive. If the contract is only 1 year, I can move without any extra obligations.

Not as fantastic as Amazon's sign-up bonuses, but the remainder of the package might compensate.

Equity

We covered Amazon's tail-heavy compensation structure, so Google's front-heavy equity structure may surprise you.

Annual structure breakdown

• 33% Year 1

• 33% Year 2

• 22% Year 3

• 12% Year 4

The goal is to get them to Google and keep them there.

Final Thoughts

This post hopefully helped you understand the 3 firms' compensation arrangements.

There's always more to discuss, such as refreshers, 401k benefits, and business discounts, but I hope this shows a distinction between these 3 firms.

Python Volatility-Based Catapult Indicator

As a catapult, this technical indicator uses three systems: Volatility (the fulcrum), Momentum (the propeller), and a Directional Filter (Acting as the support). The goal is to get a signal that predicts volatility acceleration and direction based on historical patterns. We want to know when the market will move. and where. This indicator outperforms standard indicators.

Knowledge must be accessible to everyone. This is why my new publications Contrarian Trading Strategies in Python and Trend Following Strategies in Python now include free PDF copies of my first three books (Therefore, purchasing one of the new books gets you 4 books in total). GitHub-hosted advanced indications and techniques are in the two new books above.

The Foundation: Volatility

The Catapult predicts significant changes with the 21-period Relative Volatility Index.

The Average True Range, Mean Absolute Deviation, and Standard Deviation all assess volatility. Standard Deviation will construct the Relative Volatility Index.

Standard Deviation is the most basic volatility. It underpins descriptive statistics and technical indicators like Bollinger Bands. Before calculating Standard Deviation, let's define Variance.

Variance is the squared deviations from the mean (a dispersion measure). We take the square deviations to compel the distance from the mean to be non-negative, then we take the square root to make the measure have the same units as the mean, comparing apples to apples (mean to standard deviation standard deviation). Variance formula:

As stated, standard deviation is:

# The function to add a number of columns inside an array
def adder(Data, times):
    
    for i in range(1, times + 1):
    
        new_col = np.zeros((len(Data), 1), dtype = float)
        Data = np.append(Data, new_col, axis = 1)
        
    return Data

# The function to delete a number of columns starting from an index
def deleter(Data, index, times):
    
    for i in range(1, times + 1):
    
        Data = np.delete(Data, index, axis = 1)
        
    return Data
    
# The function to delete a number of rows from the beginning
def jump(Data, jump):
    
    Data = Data[jump:, ]
    
    return Data

# Example of adding 3 empty columns to an array
my_ohlc_array = adder(my_ohlc_array, 3)

# Example of deleting the 2 columns after the column indexed at 3
my_ohlc_array = deleter(my_ohlc_array, 3, 2)

# Example of deleting the first 20 rows
my_ohlc_array = jump(my_ohlc_array, 20)

# Remember, OHLC is an abbreviation of Open, High, Low, and Close and it refers to the standard historical data file

def volatility(Data, lookback, what, where):
    
  for i in range(len(Data)):

     try:

        Data[i, where] = (Data[i - lookback + 1:i + 1, what].std())
     except IndexError:
        pass
        
  return Data

The RSI is the most popular momentum indicator, and for good reason—it excels in range markets. Its 0–100 range simplifies interpretation. Fame boosts its potential.

The more traders and portfolio managers look at the RSI, the more people will react to its signals, pushing market prices. Technical Analysis is self-fulfilling, therefore this theory is obvious yet unproven.

RSI is determined simply. Start with one-period pricing discrepancies. We must remove each closing price from the previous one. We then divide the smoothed average of positive differences by the smoothed average of negative differences. The RSI algorithm converts the Relative Strength from the last calculation into a value between 0 and 100.

def ma(Data, lookback, close, where): 
    
    Data = adder(Data, 1)
    
    for i in range(len(Data)):
           
            try:
                Data[i, where] = (Data[i - lookback + 1:i + 1, close].mean())
            
            except IndexError:
                pass
            
    # Cleaning
    Data = jump(Data, lookback)
    
    return Data
def ema(Data, alpha, lookback, what, where):
    
    alpha = alpha / (lookback + 1.0)
    beta  = 1 - alpha
    
    # First value is a simple SMA
    Data = ma(Data, lookback, what, where)
    
    # Calculating first EMA
    Data[lookback + 1, where] = (Data[lookback + 1, what] * alpha) + (Data[lookback, where] * beta)    
 
    # Calculating the rest of EMA
    for i in range(lookback + 2, len(Data)):
            try:
                Data[i, where] = (Data[i, what] * alpha) + (Data[i - 1, where] * beta)
        
            except IndexError:
                pass
            
    return Datadef rsi(Data, lookback, close, where, width = 1, genre = 'Smoothed'):
    
    # Adding a few columns
    Data = adder(Data, 7)
    
    # Calculating Differences
    for i in range(len(Data)):
        
        Data[i, where] = Data[i, close] - Data[i - width, close]
     
    # Calculating the Up and Down absolute values
    for i in range(len(Data)):
        
        if Data[i, where] > 0:
            
            Data[i, where + 1] = Data[i, where]
            
        elif Data[i, where] < 0:
            
            Data[i, where + 2] = abs(Data[i, where])
            
    # Calculating the Smoothed Moving Average on Up and Down
    absolute values        
                             
    lookback = (lookback * 2) - 1 # From exponential to smoothed
    Data = ema(Data, 2, lookback, where + 1, where + 3)
    Data = ema(Data, 2, lookback, where + 2, where + 4)
    
    # Calculating the Relative Strength
    Data[:, where + 5] = Data[:, where + 3] / Data[:, where + 4]
    
    # Calculate the Relative Strength Index
    Data[:, where + 6] = (100 - (100 / (1 + Data[:, where + 5])))  
    
    # Cleaning
    Data = deleter(Data, where, 6)
    Data = jump(Data, lookback)

    return Data

def relative_volatility_index(Data, lookback, close, where):

    # Calculating Volatility
    Data = volatility(Data, lookback, close, where)
    
    # Calculating the RSI on Volatility
    Data = rsi(Data, lookback, where, where + 1) 
    
    # Cleaning
    Data = deleter(Data, where, 1)
    
    return Data

The Arm Section: Speed

The Catapult predicts momentum direction using the 14-period Relative Strength Index.

As a reminder, the RSI ranges from 0 to 100. Two levels give contrarian signals:

• A positive response is anticipated when the market is deemed to have gone too far down at the oversold level 30, which is 30.

• When the market is deemed to have gone up too much, at overbought level 70, a bearish reaction is to be expected.

Comparing the RSI to 50 is another intriguing use. RSI above 50 indicates bullish momentum, while below 50 indicates negative momentum.

The direction-finding filter in the frame

The Catapult's directional filter uses the 200-period simple moving average to keep us trending. This keeps us sane and increases our odds.

Moving averages confirm and ride trends. Its simplicity and track record of delivering value to analysis make them the most popular technical indicator. They help us locate support and resistance, stops and targets, and the trend. Its versatility makes them essential trading tools.

This is the plain mean, employed in statistics and everywhere else in life. Simply divide the number of observations by their total values. Mathematically, it's:

We defined the moving average function above. Create the Catapult indication now.

Indicator of the Catapult

The indicator is a healthy mix of the three indicators:

• The first trigger will be provided by the 21-period Relative Volatility Index, which indicates that there will now be above average volatility and, as a result, it is possible for a directional shift.

• If the reading is above 50, the move is likely bullish, and if it is below 50, the move is likely bearish, according to the 14-period Relative Strength Index, which indicates the likelihood of the direction of the move.

• The likelihood of the move's direction will be strengthened by the 200-period simple moving average. When the market is above the 200-period moving average, we can infer that bullish pressure is there and that the upward trend will likely continue. Similar to this, if the market falls below the 200-period moving average, we recognize that there is negative pressure and that the downside is quite likely to continue.

lookback_rvi = 21
lookback_rsi = 14
lookback_ma  = 200
my_data = ma(my_data, lookback_ma, 3, 4)
my_data = rsi(my_data, lookback_rsi, 3, 5)
my_data = relative_volatility_index(my_data, lookback_rvi, 3, 6)

Two-handled overlay indicator Catapult. The first exhibits blue and green arrows for a buy signal, and the second shows blue and red for a sell signal.

The chart below shows recent EURUSD hourly values.

def signal(Data, rvi_col, signal):
    
    Data = adder(Data, 10)
        
    for i in range(len(Data)):
            
        if Data[i,     rvi_col] < 30 and \
           Data[i - 1, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 2, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 3, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 4, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 5, rvi_col] > 30:
               
               Data[i, signal] = 1
                           
    return Data

Signals are straightforward. The indicator can be utilized with other methods.

my_data = signal(my_data, 6, 7)

Lumiwealth shows how to develop all kinds of algorithms. I recommend their hands-on courses in algorithmic trading, blockchain, and machine learning.

Summary

To conclude, my goal is to contribute to objective technical analysis, which promotes more transparent methods and strategies that must be back-tested before implementation. Technical analysis will lose its reputation as subjective and unscientific.

After you find a trading method or approach, follow these steps:

• Put emotions aside and adopt an analytical perspective.

• Test it in the past in conditions and simulations taken from real life.

• Try improving it and performing a forward test if you notice any possibility.

• Transaction charges and any slippage simulation should always be included in your tests.

• Risk management and position sizing should always be included in your tests.

After checking the aforementioned, monitor the plan because market dynamics may change and render it unprofitable.