What they'll do is scarier.

My acquaintance recently joined a VC-funded startup. Money, equity, and upside possibilities were nice, but he had a nagging dread.

They just secured a $40M round and are hiring like crazy to prepare for their IPO in two years. All signals pointed to this startup's (a B2B IT business in a stable industry) success, and its equity-holding workers wouldn't pass that up.

Five months after starting the work, my friend struggled with leaving. We might overlook the awful culture and long hours at the proper price. This price plus the company's fate and survival abilities sent my friend departing in an unpleasant unplanned resignation before jumping on yet another sinking ship.

This affects founders. This affects VC-backed companies (and all businesses). This affects anyone starting, buying, or running a business.

Here's the under-the-table approach that's draining VC capital, leaving staff terrified (or jobless), founders rattled, and investors upset. How to recognize, solve, and avoid it

The unsettling reality behind door #1

You can't raise money off just your looks, right? If "looks" means your founding team's expertise, then maybe. In my friend's case, the founding team's strong qualifications and track records won over investors before talking figures.

They're hardly the only startup to raise money without a profitable customer acquisition strategy. Another firm raised money for an expensive sleep product because it's eco-friendly. They were off to the races with a few keywords and key players.

Both companies, along with numerous others, elected to invest on product development first. Company A employed all the tech, then courted half their market (they’re a tech marketplace that connects two parties). Company B spent millions on R&D to create a palatable product, then flooded the world with marketing.

My friend is on Company B's financial team, and he's seen where they've gone wrong. It's terrible.

Company A (tech market): Growing? Not quite. To achieve the ambitious expansion they (and their investors) demand, they've poured much of their little capital into salespeople: Cold-calling commission and salary salesmen. Is it working? Considering attrition and companies' dwindling capital, I don't think so.

Company B (green sleep) has been hiring, digital marketing, and opening new stores like crazy. Growing expenses should result in growing revenues and a favorable return on investment; if you grow too rapidly, you may neglect to check that ROI.

Once Company A cut headcount and Company B declared “going concerned”, my friend realized both startups had the same ailment and didn't recognize it.

I shouldn't have to ask a friend to verify a company's cash reserves and profitability to spot a financial problem. It happened anyhow.

The frightening part isn't that investors were willing to invest millions without product-market fit, CAC, or LTV estimates. That's alarming, but not as scary as the fact that startups aren't understanding the problem until VC rounds have dried up.

When they question consultants if their company will be around in 6 months. It’s a red flag. How will they stretch $20M through a 2-year recession with a $3M/month burn rate and no profitability? Alarms go off.

Who's in danger?

In a word, everyone who raised money without a profitable client acquisition strategy or enough resources to ride out dry spells.

Money mismanagement and poor priorities affect every industry (like sinking all your capital into your product, team, or tech, at the expense of probing what customer acquisition really takes and looks like).

This isn't about tech, real estate, or recession-proof luxury products. Fast, cheap, easy money flows into flashy-looking teams with buzzwords, trending industries, and attractive credentials.

If these companies can't show progress or get a profitable CAC, they can't raise more money. They die if they can't raise more money (or slash headcount and find shoestring budget solutions until they solve the real problem).

The kiss of death (and how to avoid it)

If you're running a startup and think raising VC is the answer, pause and evaluate. Do you need the money now?

I'm not saying VC is terrible or has no role. Founders have used it as a Band-Aid for larger, pervasive problems. Venture cash isn't a crutch for recruiting consumers profitably; it's rocket fuel to get you what and who you need.

Pay-to-play isn't a way to throw money at the wall and hope for a return. Pay-to-play works until you run out of money, and if you haven't mastered client acquisition, your cash will diminish quickly.

How can you avoid this bottomless pit? Tips:

• Understand your burn rate

• Keep an eye on your growth or profitability.

• Analyze each and every marketing channel and initiative.

• Make lucrative customer acquisition strategies and satisfied customers your top two priorities. not brand-new products. not stellar hires. avoid the fundraising rollercoaster to save time. If you succeed in these two tasks, investors will approach you with their thirsty offers rather than the other way around, and your cash reserves won't diminish as a result.

Not as much as your grandfather

My family friend always justified expensive, impractical expenditures by saying it was only monopoly money. In business, startups, and especially with money from investors expecting a return, that's not true.

More founders could understand that there isn't always another round if they viewed VC money as their own limited pool. When the well runs dry, you must refill it or save the day.

Venture financing isn't your grandpa's money. A discerning investor has entrusted you with dry powder in the hope that you'll use it wisely, strategically, and thoughtfully. Use it well.

People are slowly recognizing entrepreneurship's downside.

Growing up, entrepreneurship wasn't common. High school class of 2012 had no entrepreneurs.

Businesses were different.

They had staff and a lengthy history of achievement.

I never wanted a business. It felt unattainable. My friends didn't care.

Weird.

People desired degrees to attain good jobs at big companies.

When graduated high school:

• 9 out of 10 people attend college

• Earn minimum wage (7%) working in a restaurant or retail establishment

• Or join the military (3%)

Later, entrepreneurship became a thing.

2014-ish

I was in the military and most of my high school friends were in college, so I didn't hear anything.

Entrepreneurship soared in 2015, according to Google Trends.

Then more individuals were interested. Entrepreneurship went from unusual to cool.

In 2015, it was easier than ever to build a website, run Facebook advertisements, and achieve organic social media reach.

There were several online business tools.

You didn't need to spend years or money figuring it out. Most entry barriers were gone.

Everyone wanted a side gig to escape the 95.

Small company applications have increased during the previous 10 years.

2011-2014 trend continues.

2015 adds 150,000 applications. 2016 adds 200,000. Plus 300,000 in 2017.

The graph makes it look little, but that's a considerable annual spike with no indications of stopping.

By 2021, new business apps had doubled.

Entrepreneurship will return to its early 2010s level.

I think we'll go backward in 5 years.

Entrepreneurship is half as popular as it was in 2015.

In the late 2020s and 30s, entrepreneurship will again be obscure.

Entrepreneurship's decade-long splendor is fading. People will cease escaping 9-5 and launch fewer companies.

That’s not a bad thing.

I think people have a rose-colored vision of entrepreneurship. It's fashionable. People feel that they're missing out if they're not entrepreneurial.

Reality is showing up.

People say on social media, "I knew starting a business would be hard, but not this hard."

More negative posts on entrepreneurship:

Luke adds:

Is being an entrepreneur ‘healthy’? I don’t really think so. Many like Gary V, are not role models for a well-balanced life. Despite what feel-good LinkedIn tells you the odds are against you as an entrepreneur. You have to work your face off. It’s a tough but rewarding lifestyle. So maybe let’s stop glorifying it because it takes a lot of (bleepin) work to survive a pandemic, mental health battles, and a competitive market.

Entrepreneurship is no longer a pipe dream.

It’s hard.

I went full-time in March 2020. I was done by April 2021. I had a good-paying job with perks.

When that fell through (on my start date), I had to continue my entrepreneurial path. I needed money by May 1 to pay rent.

Entrepreneurship isn't as great as many think.

Entrepreneurship is a serious business.

If you have a 9-5, the grass isn't greener here. Most people aren't telling the whole story when they post on social media or quote successful entrepreneurs.

People prefer to communicate their victories than their defeats.

Is this a bad thing?

I don’t think so.

Over the previous decade, entrepreneurship went from impossible to the finest thing ever.

It peaked in 2020-21 and is returning to reality.

Startups aren't for everyone.

If you like your job, don't quit.

Entrepreneurship won't amaze people if you quit your job.

It's irrelevant.

You're doomed.

And you'll probably make less money.

If you hate your job, quit. Change jobs and bosses. Changing jobs could net you a greater pay or better perks.

When you go solo, your paycheck and perks vanish. Did I mention you'll fail, sleep less, and stress more?

Nobody will stop you from pursuing entrepreneurship. You'll face several challenges.

Possibly.

Entrepreneurship may be romanticized for years.

Based on what I see from entrepreneurs on social media and trends, entrepreneurship is challenging and few will succeed.

Startup entrepreneurs assume what risks when pitching?

Last week I signed four NDAs.

Four!

NDA stands for non-disclosure agreement. A legal document given to someone receiving confidential information. By signing, the person pledges not to share the information for a certain time. If they do, they may be in breach of contract and face legal action.

Companies use NDAs to protect trade secrets and confidential internal information from employees and contractors. Appropriate. If you manage a huge, successful firm, you don't want your employees selling their information to your competitors. To be true, business NDAs don't always prevent corporate espionage, but they usually make employees and contractors think twice before sharing.

I understand employee and contractor NDAs, but I wasn't asked to sign one. I counsel entrepreneurs, thus the NDAs I signed last week were from startups that wanted my feedback on their concepts.

I’m not a startup investor. I give startup guidance online. Despite that, four entrepreneurs thought their company ideas were so important they wanted me to sign a generically written legal form they probably acquired from a shady, spam-filled legal templates website before we could chat.

False. One company tried to get me to sign their NDA a few days after our conversation. I gently rejected, but their tenacity encouraged me. I considered sending retroactive NDAs to everyone I've ever talked to about one of my startups in case they establish a successful company based on something I said.

Two of the other three NDAs were from nearly identical companies. Good thing I didn't sign an NDA for the first one, else they may have sued me for talking to the second one as though I control the firms people pitch me.

I wasn't talking to the fourth NDA company. Instead, I received an unsolicited email from someone who wanted comments on their fundraising pitch deck but required me to sign an NDA before sending it.

That's right, before I could read a random Internet stranger's unsolicited pitch deck, I had to sign his NDA, potentially limiting my ability to discuss what was in it.

You should understand. Advisors, mentors, investors, etc. talk to hundreds of businesses each year. They cannot manage all the companies they deal with, thus they cannot risk legal trouble by talking to someone. Well, if I signed NDAs for all the startups I spoke with, half of the 300+ articles I've written on Medium over the past several years could get me sued into the next century because I've undoubtedly addressed topics in my articles that I discussed with them.

The four NDAs I received last week are part of a recent trend of entrepreneurs sending out NDAs before meetings, despite the practical and legal issues. They act like asking someone to sign away their right to talk about all they see and hear in a day is as straightforward as asking for a glass of water.

Given this inflow of NDAs, I wanted to briefly remind entrepreneurs reading this blog about the merits and cons of requesting investors (or others in the startup ecosystem) to sign your NDA.

Benefits of having investors sign your NDA include:

None. Zero. Nothing.

Disadvantages of requesting investor NDAs:

• You'll come off as an amateur who has no idea what it takes to launch a successful firm.

• Investors won't trust you with their money since you appear to be a complete amateur.

• Printing NDAs will be a waste of paper because no genuine entrepreneur will ever sign one.

I apologize for missing any cons. Please leave your remarks.

Ethereum is the second-largest cryptocurrency. The Merge, a mid-September event that will convert Ethereum's consensus process from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake if all goes according to plan, will be a game changer.

Why is Ethereum ditching proof-of-work? Because it can. We're talking about a fully functioning, open-source ecosystem with a capacity for evolution that other cryptocurrencies lack, a change that would allow it to scale up its performance from 15 transactions per second to 100,000 as its blockchain is used for more and more things. It would reduce its energy consumption by 99.95%. Vitalik Buterin, the system's founder, would play a less active role due to decentralization, and miners, who validated transactions through proof of work, would be far less important.

Why has this conversion taken so long and been so cautious? Because it involves modifying a core process while it's running to boost its performance. It requires running the new mechanism in test chains on an ever-increasing scale, assessing participant reactions, and checking for issues or restrictions. The last big test was in early June and was successful. All that's left is to converge the mechanism with the Ethereum blockchain to conclude the switch.

What's stopping Bitcoin, the leader in market capitalization and the cryptocurrency that began blockchain's appeal, from doing the same? Satoshi Nakamoto, whoever he or she is, departed from public life long ago, therefore there's no community leadership. Changing it takes a level of consensus that is impossible to achieve without strong leadership, which is why Bitcoin's evolution has been sluggish and conservative, with few modifications.

Secondly, The Merge will balance the consensus mechanism (proof-of-work or proof-of-stake) and the system decentralization or centralization. Proof-of-work prevents double-spending, thus validators must buy hardware. The system works, but it requires a lot of electricity and, as it scales up, tends to re-centralize as validators acquire more hardware and the entire network activity gets focused in a few nodes. Larger operations save more money, which increases profitability and market share. This evolution runs opposed to the concept of decentralization, and some anticipate that any system that uses proof of work as a consensus mechanism will evolve towards centralization, with fewer large firms able to invest in efficient network nodes.

Yet radical bitcoin enthusiasts share an opposite argument. In proof-of-stake, transaction validators put their funds at stake to attest that transactions are valid. The algorithm chooses who validates each transaction, giving more possibilities to nodes that put more coins at stake, which could open the door to centralization and government control.

In both cases, we're talking about long-term changes, but Bitcoin's proof-of-work has been evolving longer and seems to confirm those fears, while proof-of-stake is only employed in coins with a minuscule volume compared to Ethereum and has no predictive value.

As of mid-September, we will have two significant cryptocurrencies, each with a different consensus mechanisms and equally different characteristics: one is intrinsically conservative and used only for economic transactions, while the other has been evolving in open source mode, and can be used for other types of assets, smart contracts, or decentralized finance systems. Some even see it as the foundation of Web3.

Many things could change before September 15, but The Merge is likely to be a turning point. We'll have to follow this closely.

Python Volatility-Based Catapult Indicator

As a catapult, this technical indicator uses three systems: Volatility (the fulcrum), Momentum (the propeller), and a Directional Filter (Acting as the support). The goal is to get a signal that predicts volatility acceleration and direction based on historical patterns. We want to know when the market will move. and where. This indicator outperforms standard indicators.

Knowledge must be accessible to everyone. This is why my new publications Contrarian Trading Strategies in Python and Trend Following Strategies in Python now include free PDF copies of my first three books (Therefore, purchasing one of the new books gets you 4 books in total). GitHub-hosted advanced indications and techniques are in the two new books above.

The Foundation: Volatility

The Catapult predicts significant changes with the 21-period Relative Volatility Index.

The Average True Range, Mean Absolute Deviation, and Standard Deviation all assess volatility. Standard Deviation will construct the Relative Volatility Index.

Standard Deviation is the most basic volatility. It underpins descriptive statistics and technical indicators like Bollinger Bands. Before calculating Standard Deviation, let's define Variance.

Variance is the squared deviations from the mean (a dispersion measure). We take the square deviations to compel the distance from the mean to be non-negative, then we take the square root to make the measure have the same units as the mean, comparing apples to apples (mean to standard deviation standard deviation). Variance formula:

As stated, standard deviation is:

# The function to add a number of columns inside an array
def adder(Data, times):
    
    for i in range(1, times + 1):
    
        new_col = np.zeros((len(Data), 1), dtype = float)
        Data = np.append(Data, new_col, axis = 1)
        
    return Data

# The function to delete a number of columns starting from an index
def deleter(Data, index, times):
    
    for i in range(1, times + 1):
    
        Data = np.delete(Data, index, axis = 1)
        
    return Data
    
# The function to delete a number of rows from the beginning
def jump(Data, jump):
    
    Data = Data[jump:, ]
    
    return Data

# Example of adding 3 empty columns to an array
my_ohlc_array = adder(my_ohlc_array, 3)

# Example of deleting the 2 columns after the column indexed at 3
my_ohlc_array = deleter(my_ohlc_array, 3, 2)

# Example of deleting the first 20 rows
my_ohlc_array = jump(my_ohlc_array, 20)

# Remember, OHLC is an abbreviation of Open, High, Low, and Close and it refers to the standard historical data file

def volatility(Data, lookback, what, where):
    
  for i in range(len(Data)):

     try:

        Data[i, where] = (Data[i - lookback + 1:i + 1, what].std())
     except IndexError:
        pass
        
  return Data

The RSI is the most popular momentum indicator, and for good reason—it excels in range markets. Its 0–100 range simplifies interpretation. Fame boosts its potential.

The more traders and portfolio managers look at the RSI, the more people will react to its signals, pushing market prices. Technical Analysis is self-fulfilling, therefore this theory is obvious yet unproven.

RSI is determined simply. Start with one-period pricing discrepancies. We must remove each closing price from the previous one. We then divide the smoothed average of positive differences by the smoothed average of negative differences. The RSI algorithm converts the Relative Strength from the last calculation into a value between 0 and 100.

def ma(Data, lookback, close, where): 
    
    Data = adder(Data, 1)
    
    for i in range(len(Data)):
           
            try:
                Data[i, where] = (Data[i - lookback + 1:i + 1, close].mean())
            
            except IndexError:
                pass
            
    # Cleaning
    Data = jump(Data, lookback)
    
    return Data
def ema(Data, alpha, lookback, what, where):
    
    alpha = alpha / (lookback + 1.0)
    beta  = 1 - alpha
    
    # First value is a simple SMA
    Data = ma(Data, lookback, what, where)
    
    # Calculating first EMA
    Data[lookback + 1, where] = (Data[lookback + 1, what] * alpha) + (Data[lookback, where] * beta)    
 
    # Calculating the rest of EMA
    for i in range(lookback + 2, len(Data)):
            try:
                Data[i, where] = (Data[i, what] * alpha) + (Data[i - 1, where] * beta)
        
            except IndexError:
                pass
            
    return Datadef rsi(Data, lookback, close, where, width = 1, genre = 'Smoothed'):
    
    # Adding a few columns
    Data = adder(Data, 7)
    
    # Calculating Differences
    for i in range(len(Data)):
        
        Data[i, where] = Data[i, close] - Data[i - width, close]
     
    # Calculating the Up and Down absolute values
    for i in range(len(Data)):
        
        if Data[i, where] > 0:
            
            Data[i, where + 1] = Data[i, where]
            
        elif Data[i, where] < 0:
            
            Data[i, where + 2] = abs(Data[i, where])
            
    # Calculating the Smoothed Moving Average on Up and Down
    absolute values        
                             
    lookback = (lookback * 2) - 1 # From exponential to smoothed
    Data = ema(Data, 2, lookback, where + 1, where + 3)
    Data = ema(Data, 2, lookback, where + 2, where + 4)
    
    # Calculating the Relative Strength
    Data[:, where + 5] = Data[:, where + 3] / Data[:, where + 4]
    
    # Calculate the Relative Strength Index
    Data[:, where + 6] = (100 - (100 / (1 + Data[:, where + 5])))  
    
    # Cleaning
    Data = deleter(Data, where, 6)
    Data = jump(Data, lookback)

    return Data

def relative_volatility_index(Data, lookback, close, where):

    # Calculating Volatility
    Data = volatility(Data, lookback, close, where)
    
    # Calculating the RSI on Volatility
    Data = rsi(Data, lookback, where, where + 1) 
    
    # Cleaning
    Data = deleter(Data, where, 1)
    
    return Data

The Arm Section: Speed

The Catapult predicts momentum direction using the 14-period Relative Strength Index.

As a reminder, the RSI ranges from 0 to 100. Two levels give contrarian signals:

• A positive response is anticipated when the market is deemed to have gone too far down at the oversold level 30, which is 30.

• When the market is deemed to have gone up too much, at overbought level 70, a bearish reaction is to be expected.

Comparing the RSI to 50 is another intriguing use. RSI above 50 indicates bullish momentum, while below 50 indicates negative momentum.

The direction-finding filter in the frame

The Catapult's directional filter uses the 200-period simple moving average to keep us trending. This keeps us sane and increases our odds.

Moving averages confirm and ride trends. Its simplicity and track record of delivering value to analysis make them the most popular technical indicator. They help us locate support and resistance, stops and targets, and the trend. Its versatility makes them essential trading tools.

This is the plain mean, employed in statistics and everywhere else in life. Simply divide the number of observations by their total values. Mathematically, it's:

We defined the moving average function above. Create the Catapult indication now.

Indicator of the Catapult

The indicator is a healthy mix of the three indicators:

• The first trigger will be provided by the 21-period Relative Volatility Index, which indicates that there will now be above average volatility and, as a result, it is possible for a directional shift.

• If the reading is above 50, the move is likely bullish, and if it is below 50, the move is likely bearish, according to the 14-period Relative Strength Index, which indicates the likelihood of the direction of the move.

• The likelihood of the move's direction will be strengthened by the 200-period simple moving average. When the market is above the 200-period moving average, we can infer that bullish pressure is there and that the upward trend will likely continue. Similar to this, if the market falls below the 200-period moving average, we recognize that there is negative pressure and that the downside is quite likely to continue.

lookback_rvi = 21
lookback_rsi = 14
lookback_ma  = 200
my_data = ma(my_data, lookback_ma, 3, 4)
my_data = rsi(my_data, lookback_rsi, 3, 5)
my_data = relative_volatility_index(my_data, lookback_rvi, 3, 6)

Two-handled overlay indicator Catapult. The first exhibits blue and green arrows for a buy signal, and the second shows blue and red for a sell signal.

The chart below shows recent EURUSD hourly values.

def signal(Data, rvi_col, signal):
    
    Data = adder(Data, 10)
        
    for i in range(len(Data)):
            
        if Data[i,     rvi_col] < 30 and \
           Data[i - 1, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 2, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 3, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 4, rvi_col] > 30 and \
           Data[i - 5, rvi_col] > 30:
               
               Data[i, signal] = 1
                           
    return Data

Signals are straightforward. The indicator can be utilized with other methods.

my_data = signal(my_data, 6, 7)

Lumiwealth shows how to develop all kinds of algorithms. I recommend their hands-on courses in algorithmic trading, blockchain, and machine learning.

Summary

To conclude, my goal is to contribute to objective technical analysis, which promotes more transparent methods and strategies that must be back-tested before implementation. Technical analysis will lose its reputation as subjective and unscientific.

After you find a trading method or approach, follow these steps:

• Put emotions aside and adopt an analytical perspective.

• Test it in the past in conditions and simulations taken from real life.

• Try improving it and performing a forward test if you notice any possibility.

• Transaction charges and any slippage simulation should always be included in your tests.

• Risk management and position sizing should always be included in your tests.

After checking the aforementioned, monitor the plan because market dynamics may change and render it unprofitable.

Japan's startup challenge: 7 reasons

Every day, another Silicon Valley business is bought for a billion dollars, making its founders rich while growing the economy and improving consumers' lives.

Google, Amazon, Twitter, and Medium dominate our daily lives. Tesla automobiles and Moderna Covid vaccinations.

The startup movement started in Silicon Valley, California, but the rest of the world is catching up. Global startup buzz is rising. Except Japan.

644 of CB Insights' 1170 unicorns—successful firms valued at over $1 billion—are US-based. China follows with 302 and India third with 108.

Japan? 6!

1% of US startups succeed. The third-largest economy is tied with small Switzerland for startup success.

Mexico (8), Indonesia (12), and Brazil (12) have more successful startups than Japan (16). South Korea has 16. Yikes! Problem?

Why Don't Startups Exist in Japan More?

Not about money. Japanese firms invest in startups. To invest in startups, big Japanese firms create Silicon Valley offices instead of Tokyo.

Startups aren't the issue either. Local governments are competing to be Japan's Shirikon Tani, providing entrepreneurs financing, office space, and founder visas.

Startup accelerators like Plug and Play in Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto, the Startup Hub in Kobe, and Google for Startups are many.

Most of the companies I've encountered in Japan are either local offices of foreign firms aiming to expand into the Japanese market or small businesses offering local services rather than disrupting a staid industry with new ideas.

There must be a reason Japan can develop world-beating giant corporations like Toyota, Nintendo, Shiseido, and Suntory but not inventive startups.

Culture, obviously. Japanese culture excels in teamwork, craftsmanship, and quality, but it hates moving fast, making mistakes, and breaking things.

If you have a brilliant idea in Silicon Valley, quit your job, get money from friends and family, and build a prototype. To fund the business, you approach angel investors and VCs.

Most non-startup folks don't aware that venture capitalists don't want good, profitable enterprises. That's wonderful if you're developing a solid small business to consult, open shops, or make a specialty product. However, you must pay for it or borrow money. Venture capitalists want moon rockets. Silicon Valley is big or bust. Almost 90% will explode and crash. The few successes are remarkable enough to make up for the failures.

Silicon Valley's high-risk, high-reward attitude contrasts with Japan's incrementalism. Japan makes the best automobiles and cleanrooms, but it fails to produce new items that grow the economy.

Changeable? Absolutely. But, what makes huge manufacturing enterprises successful and what makes Japan a safe and comfortable place to live are inextricably connected with the lack of startups.

Barriers to Startup Development in Japan

These are the 7 biggest obstacles to Japanese startup success.

1. Unresponsive Employment Market

While the lifelong employment system in Japan is evolving, the average employee stays at their firm for 12 years (15 years for men at large organizations) compared to 4.3 years in the US. Seniority, not experience or aptitude, determines career routes, making it tough to quit a job to join a startup and then return to corporate work if it fails.

1. Conservative Buyers

Even if your product is buggy and undocumented, US customers will migrate to a cheaper, superior one. Japanese corporations demand perfection from their trusted suppliers and keep with them forever. Startups need income fast, yet product evaluation takes forever.

1. Failure intolerance

Japanese business failures harm lives. Failed forever. It hinders risk-taking. Silicon Valley embraces failure. Build another startup if your first fails. Build a third if that fails. Every setback is viewed as a learning opportunity for success.

4. No Corporate Purchases

Silicon Valley industrial giants will buy fast-growing startups for a lot of money. Many huge firms have stopped developing new goods and instead buy startups after the product is validated.

Japanese companies prefer in-house product development over startup acquisitions. No acquisitions mean no startup investment and no investor reward.

Startup investments can also be monetized through stock market listings. Public stock listings in Japan are risky because the Nikkei was stagnant for 35 years while the S&P rose 14x.

5. Social Unity Above Wealth

In Silicon Valley, everyone wants to be rich. That creates a competitive environment where everyone wants to succeed, but it also promotes fraud and societal problems.

Japan values communal harmony above individual success. Wealthy folks and overachievers are avoided. In Japan, renegades are nearly impossible.

6. Rote Learning Education System

Japanese high school graduates outperform most Americans. Nonetheless, Japanese education is known for its rote memorization. The American system, which fails too many kids, emphasizes creativity to create new products.

1. Immigration.

Immigrants start 55% of successful Silicon Valley firms. Some come for university, some to escape poverty and war, and some are recruited by Silicon Valley startups and stay to start their own.

Japan is difficult for immigrants to start a business due to language barriers, visa restrictions, and social isolation.

How Japan Can Promote Innovation

Patchwork solutions to deep-rooted cultural issues will not work. If customers don't buy things, immigration visas won't aid startups. Startups must have a chance of being acquired for a huge sum to attract investors. If risky startups fail, employees won't join.

Will Japan never have a startup culture?

Once a consensus is reached, Japan changes rapidly. A dwindling population and standard of living may lead to such consensus.

Toyota and Sony were firms with renowned founders who used technology to transform the world. Repeatable.

Silicon Valley is flawed too. Many people struggle due to wealth disparities, job churn and layoffs, and the tremendous ups and downs of the economy caused by stock market fluctuations.

The founders of the 10% successful startups are heroes. The 90% that fail and return to good-paying jobs with benefits are never mentioned.

Silicon Valley startup culture and Japanese corporate culture are opposites. Each have pros and cons. Big Japanese corporations make the most reliable, dependable, high-quality products yet move too slowly. That's good for creating cars, not social networking apps.

Can innovation and success be encouraged without eroding social cohesion? That can motivate software firms to move fast and break things while recognizing the beauty and precision of expert craftsmen? A hybrid culture where Japan can make the world's best and most original items. Hopefully.