As a tech-savvy person (and software engineer) or just a casual technology user, I'm sure you've had this same question countless times: How do I make money online? and how do I make money with my PC/Mac?
You're in luck! Today, I will list the top 5 easiest ways to make money online. Maybe a top ten in the future? Top 5 tips for 2022.

1. Using the gig economy

There are many websites on the internet that allow you to earn extra money using skills and equipment that you already own.
I'm referring to the gig economy. It's a great way to earn a steady passive income from the comfort of your own home. For some sites, premium subscriptions are available to increase sales and access features like bidding on more proposals.
Some of these are:

• Freelancer
• Upwork
• Fiverr (⭐ my personal favorite)
• TaskRabbit

2. Mineprize

MINEPRIZE is a great way to make money online. What's more, You need not do anything! You earn money by lending your idle CPU power to MINEPRIZE.
To register with MINEPRIZE, all you need is an email address and a password. Let MINEPRIZE use your resources, and watch the money roll in! You can earn up to $100 per month by letting your computer calculate. That's insane.

3. Writing

“O Romeo, Romeo, why art thou Romeo?” Okay, I admit that not all writing is Shakespearean. To be a copywriter, you'll need to be fluent in English. Thankfully, we don't have to use typewriters anymore.

Writing is a skill that can earn you a lot of money (claps for the rhyme).
Here are a few ways you can make money typing on your fancy keyboard:
Self-publish a book
Write scripts for video creators
Write for social media
Book-checking
Content marketing help
What a list within a list!

4. Coding

Yes, kids. You've probably coded before if you understand 
You've probably coded before if you understand 

Computational thinking (or coding) is one of the most lucrative ways to earn extra money, or even as a main source of income.
Of course, there are hardcode coders (like me) who write everything line by line, binary di — okay, that last part is a bit exaggerated.
But you can also make money by writing websites or apps or creating low code or no code platforms.
But you can also make money by writing websites or apps or creating low code or no code platforms.
Some low-code platforms
Sheet : spreadsheets to apps :
Loading... We'll install your new app... No-Code Your team can create apps and automate tasks. Agile…
www.appsheet.com

Low-code platform | Business app creator - Zoho Creator
Work is going digital, and businesses of all sizes must adapt quickly. Zoho Creator is a...
www.zoho.com

Sell your data with TrueSource. NO CODE NEEDED
Upload data, configure your product, and earn in minutes.
www.truesource.io

Cool, huh?

5. Created Content

If we use the internet correctly, we can gain unfathomable wealth and extra money. But this one is a bit more difficult. Unlike some of the other items on this list, it takes a lot of time up front.
I'm referring to sites like YouTube and Medium. It's a great way to earn money both passively and actively. With the likes of Jake- and Logan Paul, PewDiePie (a.k.a. Felix Kjellberg) and others, it's never too late to become a millionaire on YouTube. YouTubers are always rising to the top with great content.

6. NFTs and Cryptocurrency

It is now possible to amass large sums of money by buying and selling digital assets on NFTs and cryptocurrency exchanges. Binance's Initial Game Offer rewards early investors who produce the best results.
One awesome game sold a piece of its plot for US$7.2 million! It's Axie Infinity. It's free and available on Google Play and Apple Store.

7. Affiliate Marketing

Affiliate marketing is a form of advertising where businesses pay others (like bloggers) to promote their goods and services. Here's an example. I write a blog (like this one) and post an affiliate link to an item I recommend buying — say, a camera — and if you buy the camera, I get a commission!
These programs pay well:

• Elementor
• AWeber
• Sendinblue
• ConvertKit\sLeadpages
• GetResponse
• SEMRush\sFiverr
• Pabbly

8. Start a blog

Now, if you're a writer or just really passionate about something or a niche, blogging could potentially monetize that passion!
Create a blog about anything you can think of. It's okay to start right here on Medium, as I did.

9. Dropshipping

And I mean that in the best possible way — drop shopping is ridiculously easy to set up, but difficult to maintain for some.
Luckily, Shopify has made setting up an online store a breeze. Drop-shipping from Alibaba and DHGate is quite common. You've got a winner if you can find a local distributor willing to let you drop ship their product!

10. Set up an Online Course

If you have a skill and can articulate it, online education is for you.
Skillshare, Pluralsight, and Coursera have all made inroads in recent years, upskilling people with courses that YOU can create and earn from.

That's it for today! Please share if you liked this post. If not, well —

Everyone is talking about the $UST attack right now, including Janet Yellen. But no one is talking about how much money the attacker made (or how brilliant it was). Lets dig in.

Our story starts in late March, when the Luna Foundation Guard (or LFG) starts buying BTC to help back $UST. LFG started accumulating BTC on 3/22, and by March 26th had a $1bn+ BTC position. This is leg #1 that made this trade (or attack) brilliant.

The second leg comes in the form of the 4pool Frax announcement for $UST on April 1st. This added the second leg needed to help execute the strategy in a capital efficient way (liquidity will be lower and then the attack is on).

We don't know when the attacker borrowed 100k BTC to start the position, other than that it was sold into Kwon's buying (still speculation). LFG bought 15k BTC between March 27th and April 11th, so lets just take the average price between these dates ($42k).

So you have a ~$4.2bn short position built. Over the same time, the attacker builds a $1bn OTC position in $UST. The stage is now set to create a run on the bank and get paid on your BTC short. In anticipation of the 4pool, LFG initially removes $150mm from 3pool liquidity.

The liquidity was pulled on 5/8 and then the attacker uses $350mm of UST to drain curve liquidity (and LFG pulls another $100mm of liquidity).

But this only starts the de-pegging (down to 0.972 at the lows). LFG begins selling $BTC to defend the peg, causing downward pressure on BTC while the run on $UST was just getting started.

With the Curve liquidity drained, the attacker used the remainder of their $1b OTC $UST position ($650mm or so) to start offloading on Binance. As withdrawals from Anchor turned from concern into panic, this caused a real de-peg as people fled for the exits

So LFG is selling $BTC to restore the peg while the attacker is selling $UST on Binance. Eventually the chain gets congested and the CEXs suspend withdrawals of $UST, fueling the bank run panic. $UST de-pegs to 60c at the bottom, while $BTC bleeds out.

The crypto community panics as they wonder how much $BTC will be sold to keep the peg. There are liquidations across the board and LUNA pukes because of its redemption mechanism (the attacker very well could have shorted LUNA as well). BTC fell 25% from $42k on 4/11 to $31.3k

So how much did our attacker make? There aren't details on where they covered obviously, but if they are able to cover (or buy back) the entire position at ~$32k, that means they made $952mm on the short.

On the $350mm of $UST curve dumps I don't think they took much of a loss, lets assume 3% or just $11m. And lets assume that all the Binance dumps were done at 80c, thats another $125mm cost of doing business. For a grand total profit of $815mm (bf borrow cost).

BTC was the perfect playground for the trade, as the liquidity was there to pull it off. While having LFG involved in BTC, and foreseeing they would sell to keep the peg (and prevent LUNA from dying) was the kicker.

Lastly, the liquidity being low on 3pool in advance of 4pool allowed the attacker to drain it with only $350mm, causing the broader panic in both BTC and $UST. Any shorts on LUNA would've added a lot of P&L here as well, with it falling -65% since 5/7.

And for the reply guys, yes I know a lot of this involves some speculation & assumptions. But a lot of money was made here either way, and I thought it would be cool to dive into how they did it.

You can make a proof for the statement "I know a secret number such that if you take the word ‘cow', add the number to the end, and SHA256 hash it 100 million times, the output starts with 0x57d00485aa". The verifier can verify the proof far more quickly than it would take for them to run 100 million hashes themselves, and the proof would also not reveal what the secret number is.

In the context of blockchains, this has 2 very powerful applications: Perhaps the most powerful cryptographic technology to come out of the last decade is general-purpose succinct zero knowledge proofs, usually called zk-SNARKs ("zero knowledge succinct arguments of knowledge"). A zk-SNARK allows you to generate a proof that some computation has some particular output, in such a way that the proof can be verified extremely quickly even if the underlying computation takes a very long time to run. The "ZK" part adds an additional feature: the proof can keep some of the inputs to the computation hidden.

You can make a proof for the statement "I know a secret number such that if you take the word ‘cow', add the number to the end, and SHA256 hash it 100 million times, the output starts with 0x57d00485aa". The verifier can verify the proof far more quickly than it would take for them to run 100 million hashes themselves, and the proof would also not reveal what the secret number is.

In the context of blockchains, this has two very powerful applications:

1. Scalability: if a block takes a long time to verify, one person can verify it and generate a proof, and everyone else can just quickly verify the proof instead
2. Privacy: you can prove that you have the right to transfer some asset (you received it, and you didn't already transfer it) without revealing the link to which asset you received. This ensures security without unduly leaking information about who is transacting with whom to the public.

But zk-SNARKs are quite complex; indeed, as recently as in 2014-17 they were still frequently called "moon math". The good news is that since then, the protocols have become simpler and our understanding of them has become much better. This post will try to explain how ZK-SNARKs work, in a way that should be understandable to someone with a medium level of understanding of mathematics.

Why ZK-SNARKs "should" be hard

Let us take the example that we started with: we have a number (we can encode "cow" followed by the secret input as an integer), we take the SHA256 hash of that number, then we do that again another 99,999,999 times, we get the output, and we check what its starting digits are. This is a huge computation.

A "succinct" proof is one where both the size of the proof and the time required to verify it grow much more slowly than the computation to be verified. If we want a "succinct" proof, we cannot require the verifier to do some work per round of hashing (because then the verification time would be proportional to the computation). Instead, the verifier must somehow check the whole computation without peeking into each individual piece of the computation.

One natural technique is random sampling: how about we just have the verifier peek into the computation in 500 different places, check that those parts are correct, and if all 500 checks pass then assume that the rest of the computation must with high probability be fine, too?

Such a procedure could even be turned into a non-interactive proof using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic: the prover computes a Merkle root of the computation, uses the Merkle root to pseudorandomly choose 500 indices, and provides the 500 corresponding Merkle branches of the data. The key idea is that the prover does not know which branches they will need to reveal until they have already "committed to" the data. If a malicious prover tries to fudge the data after learning which indices are going to be checked, that would change the Merkle root, which would result in a new set of random indices, which would require fudging the data again... trapping the malicious prover in an endless cycle.

But unfortunately there is a fatal flaw in naively applying random sampling to spot-check a computation in this way: computation is inherently fragile. If a malicious prover flips one bit somewhere in the middle of a computation, they can make it give a completely different result, and a random sampling verifier would almost never find out.

It only takes one deliberately inserted error, that a random check would almost never catch, to make a computation give a completely incorrect result.

If tasked with the problem of coming up with a zk-SNARK protocol, many people would make their way to this point and then get stuck and give up. How can a verifier possibly check every single piece of the computation, without looking at each piece of the computation individually? There is a clever solution.